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1 Introduction 
 
1.1 Preamble 
 
Article14 of Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) states that “Everyone has the 
right to seek and to enjoy in other country asylum from persecution”. 
 
The North Korean refugee crisis merits significant international attention because these 
people are the most vulnerable group and the silent victims in our international community 
of the last few decades.   
 
It is a question of State sovereignty as to whether China1  recognizes North Koreans as 
refugees or not and provides them with humanitarian relief. China argues that North 
Koreans are not refugees, forcibly repatriates them and blocks United Nations High 
Commissions for Refugees (UNHCR) and humanitarian workers’ access to protect them.   
 
China is a respectable permanent member of the United Nations Security Council and the 
Executive committee as its High Commissioner for refugees (EXCOM).  China is a party 
of the 1951 Refugee Convention and its 1967 Protocol.  China has also ratified the Untied 
Nations Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment (CAT) which prohibits any repatriation where persons are in danger of being 
subjected to torture.  In addition, China has ratified the Convention on the Elimination of 
All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) and the Convention on the Rights 
of the Child (CRC).  As indicated by Chinese legislation system, once these international 
treaties are affirmed, it has a binding effect on the Chinese law and, in the event of conflicts, 
international law prevails over the national law. 
                                                 
1 The term of ‘China’ refers ‘People’s Republic of China (PRC)’. 
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The aim of this thesis is to explore the duties of China as a pertaining the non-refoulement 
and human rights standards according to the theory of state responsibility. It will also 
endeavour to discuss the North Koreans’ human rights situation and their refugee eligibility 
in a bid to support North Koreans’ refugee claims and protect them from forcible 
repatriation. 
 
The methodology of work includes various international, regional and domestic 
instruments such as treaties, judicial decisions, books, resolutions, journals, reports, 
comments, opinions and articles.  I will also have recourse to the 1951 Refugee Convention, 
UDHR, CAT, ICCPR and International Law Commissions’ draft articles on Responsibility 
of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts (ILC) for discussing about the theory of non-
refoulement and State responsibility.  This work will also make extensive reference to the 
Charter of the United Nations and Vienna Convention on the law of Treaties for 
interpreting various legal provisions. 
 
 1.2 Flight to China due to serious human rights abuses marked by forcible 
repatriation 
 
According to the Ministry of Unification of the Republic of Korea (South Korea), a secret 
agreement regarding illegal immigrant repatriation was signed between China and North 
Korea2  in 1961.  In August of 1986, China entered into another bilateral agreement with 
North Korea by which it co-operated to return North Koreans who crossed border.  It is 
entitled ‘Mutual Cooperation Protocol for the Work of Maintaining National Security and 
Social Order in the Border Areas’.3   Article of 4 of this Mutual Cooperation Protocol 
states that the contracting States must: 
 “…cooperate on the work of prevention the illegal border crossing residents…”.   
                                                 
2 The term of ‘North Korea’ refers ‘the Democratic People’s of Korea (DPRK)’. 
3 North Korean Refugee Crisis: Human Rights and International Response, Edited by Stephan Haggard 
&Marcus Noland, U.S. Committee for Human Rights in North Korea, 2006 pp.40.  See also White Paper on 
Human Rights in North Korea Edited by Korean Institute for National Unification, Seoul 1998. 
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 In addition, China’s Jilin Province has a local law that imposes the obligation to return of 
North Koreans who enter illegally.4 
 
For a number of years, however, China has informally tolerated the presence of North 
Koreans. Nonetheless, in 1999 it began to forcible return large numbers of them, claiming 
that they were not refugees but ‘illegal migrants’.5   The United States Committee for 
Refugees and Immigrations reported that China had repatriated at least 5000 North Koreans 
by 2004 through defining the North Koreans as falling outside of the protection of the 1951 
Refugee Convention.6  
 
It is hard to find the exact reason for the flight of the North Koreans to seek asylum in 
China because of the lack of sources and because the situation of North Korea which is 
known as being the most veiled nation in the international community. However, NGOs 
and International scholars have listed starvation and fundamental human rights abuses as 
the reasons.7  The North Koreans have suffered severe food shortages due to natural 
disasters since the mid-1990s and have been oppressed and deprived of their right to life by 
a corrupted unrealistic government. Regarding North Koreans’ human rights situation will 
be explained more in Chapter 4. 
 
Human Rights Watch and the Untied States Congress also reported that hundreds of 
thousands of North Koreans had desperately crossed the border to China to find the basic 
right to life from which they had been deprived by their government.  However, the North 
Koreans in China often become victims of human trafficking, human rights abuses and 
                                                 
4 Ibid pp.40 
5 Guy S.Goodwin-Gill and Jane McAdam, The Refugee in International Law (3rd Edition), 2007 pp.231  
6 US Committee for Refugee and Immigrations, World Refugee Survey – China (2005) 
7 The invisible Exodus: North Koreans in the People’s Republic of China, Edited by Human Rights Watch 
(2002) pp.2.  See also U.S. CRS Report for Congress-North Korean Refugees in China and Human Rights 
Issues: International Response and U.S. Policy Opinions (September 26, 2007) pp.6. 
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sexual violence.  Most of them are struggling with a deep fear that the Chinese authorities 
will catch them for repatriation to North Korea.8   
 
An analysis of current information provided by the UNHCR concludes that many North 
Koreans may well be considered refugees.9  The High Commissioner has thus argued that 
the plight of North Koreans who leave their country illegally remains a serious concern in 
China.   The UNHCR has been making efforts to obtain access to them for a number of 
years, but it has consistently been denied by the Chinese authorities.  
 
A serious event under international law is that armed Chinese authorities entered the 
Japanese consulate located in Shenyang without its permission in May 2002 and forcibly 
removed five North Korean asylum seekers who had been sheltered within the compound 
and repatriated them to the North Korea. 10 11 As indicated by the international law, this is a 
violation of the 1964 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations. Article 22 of this 
Convention which provides that: 
“The premises of the mission shall be inviolable. The agents of the receiving State may not 
enter them, except with the consent of the head of the mission.”12    
                                                 
8 The Invisible Exodus, supra pp.9-18 and U.S. CRS Report, supra pp.4-12 
9 The UNHCR High Commissioner’s Statement during the EXCOM secession, 29 September 2003 
10 See Kate Jastrain& Marilyn Achiron& UNHCR, Refugee Protection: A Guide to International Refugee 
Law (UNHCR 2001); ‘Asylum-seeker’ is a general term for a person who has not yet received a decision on 
his/her claim for refugee status. It could refer to someone who has not yet submitted an application or 
someone who is waiting for an answer. Not every asylum-seeker will ultimately be recognized as a refugee, 
but many will. Until the claim is examined fairly, the asylum-seeker is entitled to not be returned, according 
to the principle of non-refoulement, and to benefit from humanitarian standards of treatment. 
11 See Elim Chan & Andreas schloenhardt, North Korean Refugees and International Refugee Law, 
International Journal of Refugee Law, 2007 pp.238.  Since 2002, NGOs and Humanitarian organizations 
assisted North Koreans to slip into embassy and consular compounds and other foreign building to request 
asylum and some of them successfully entered to leave and proceeded to South Korea.  
12 China ratified this Convention on 25 November 1975.  
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The 1963 Convention on Consular Relations affirms the inviolability of a mission or 
consular premise by the host country as well.13 Based on these legal instruments, China 
should not slip into foreign diplomatic premises without any permission. The State of the 
foreign premise where the asylum seeker is asking protection has a responsibility not to 
return the asylum seeker to the origin country or territory where he/she will be 
persecuted.14   
 
Vice versa, China has reacted to this by placing heavy security around foreign diplomatic 
compounds and applying more security measures at the border between China and North 
Korea.  Chinese authorities have stepped up their house raids in search of North Koreans 
and even offer bounties to Chinese citizens who can disclose the whereabouts of North 
Korean refugees.15 
 
The Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued a letter to foreign embassies and demanded 
that:  
“According to the principle of international law that embassies and consulates has no right 
of asylum, the Chinese side also wishes embassies concerned to render cooperation and 
inform the Consular. Department of Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs in case the illegal 
intruders were found, and hand over the intruders to the Chinese public security organs. 
                                                 
13 China ratified this Convention on 2 July 1979. Article 31 (1) (2) of the Convention on Consular Relations 
stated that “Consular premises shall be inviolable to the extent provided in this Article. The Authorities of the 
receiving State shall not enter that part of the consular premises which is used exclusively for the purpose of 
the work of the consular post except with the consent of the head of the consular post or of his designee or of 
the head of the diplomatic mission of the sending State. The consent of the head of the consular post may, 
however, be assumed in case of fire or other disaster requiring prompt protective action.”   
14 Elim Chan & Andreas Schloenhardt, supra pp.238 
15 Amnesty International 2002, and 2003 Report.  See also Appendix D, corresponds with LFNKR-the NK 
Refugee Japanese NGO, China Raises Bounty on North Korean Refugees 1600%(from 500 Yuan  up to 8000 
Yuan(around 1,150 US Dollars))  and this amount is equivalent to the average annual income in China.  
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The above-mentioned principle is also applicable in dealing with the intruders into foreign 
consulate institutions”.16 
 
1.3 State responsibility under general international law and the principle of non-
refoulement as ‘peremptory norm’ 
 
State responsibility is a fundamental principal of international law, arising out of the nature 
of the international legal system, the doctrines of state sovereignty and equality of states.17  
It is not based upon national law but is governed by international law.18 
State responsibility may occur directly from acts and omissions of government officials and 
agents, or indirectly where the domestic legal and administrative systems fail to guarantee 
the observance of international standards whether the obligation to observe those standards 
rests on treaty, custom, or some other basis.19  
 
In the Barcelona Traction case20, the International Court of Justice drew the distinction 
between obligations of a State arising towards ‘another State’ and obligations towards ‘the 
international community as a whole’.  The court described ‘community obligation’ as: 
“Such obligation derive, for example, in contemporary international law, from the 
outlawing of acts of aggression and of genocide, as also from the principles and rules 
concerning the basic rights of the human person, including protection from slavery and 
racial discrimination”. 
 
                                                 
16 Appendix B 
17 Malcolm N. Shaw, International Law (5th Edition), Cambridge (2003) pp.694 
18 art.3 of the International Law Commission’s draft articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally 
Wrongful Acts on August 2001 
19 Ian Brownlie, Principle of Public International Law (5th Edition) Oxford, 1998 pp.435-448 
20 See Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company, Limited (Belgium v Spain), ICJ reports 1970 para.3-
51. It is one of the popular cases in international law because it demonstrates how the concept of diplomatic 
protection under international law can apply equally to corporations as to individuals and also expanded the 
notion of obligations in the international law. 
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The meaning of ‘community obligation’ is considered the same as ‘peremptory norm’ 
which was accepted by the International Law of Commission and was reflected in Article 
50 of the final draft on the Law of Treaties of 1966, which described that:  
“A treaty is void if it conflicts with a peremptory norm of general international law from 
which no derogation is permitted and which can be modified only by a subsequent norm of 
general international law having the same character”.21  
 
 Article 53 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties provides: 
 “A  peremptory norm of general international law is defined as ‘a norm accepted and 
recognized by the international community of states as a whole as a norm from which no 
derogation is permitted and which can be modified only by a subsequent norm of general 
international law having the same character”. 
 
The principle of non-refoulement prescribes, broadly, that no refugee22should be 
repatriated to any country where he/she is likely to face persecution, other ill-treatment, or 
torture. This principle is a part of customary international law and is even considered a 
‘peremptory norm’.23  It has found expression in various international instruments adopted 
at the universal levels and is even generally accepted by States that are not party to the 
1951 Refugee Convention.24 
 
By the late 1980s, the Executive Committee (EXCOM) of the UNHCR concluded that ‘all 
States’ were bound to refrain from refoulement on the basis that such acts were ‘contrary to 
                                                 
21 Draft Articles on the law of treaties, Report of the of the International Law Commission on the work of its 
Eighteenth Section, 4 May-19 July 1966, Official Records of the general Assembly, 21st Session, supplement 
No.9 (A/6309/Rev.1). 
22 The use of term ‘Refugee’ does not mean that these persons meet the legal standard for being Refugees 
under the 1951 Refugee Convention. 
23 Guy S. Goodwin-Gill and Jane McAdam, supra pp.201-229  
24 Kate Jastrain& Marilyn Achiron& UNHCR,  supra pp.7  See also the UNHCR High Commissioner’s 
Statement at EXCOM on 29 Sep. 2003. The High Commissioner stated that: “the principle of non-
refoulement must be respected above all”. 
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fundamental prohibitions against these practices’.  In 1996, the EXCOM members 
concluded that non-refoulement had acquired the level of ‘peremptory norm’ when they 
determined that the ‘principle of non-refoulement is not subject to derogation’.25 
 
Further, the principle of non-refoulement as a peremptory norm is to be found in state 
practice, which has been discussed in Latin America on the basis of the 1984 Cartagena 
Declaration.  One of its conclusions was that: 
“The principle is imperative in regard to refugees and in the present state of international 
law should be acknowledged and observed as a rule of jus cogens”.26    
 
Numerous international scholars and publicists have considered the principle of non-
refoulement as a ‘peremptory norm’.27 
 
1.4 Persistence of State Sovereignty and China’s duty of ‘due diligence’ in protecting 
North Koreans 
 
Paragraph 1 Article 2 of the Charter of the United Nations recognizes the ‘sovereign 
equality of all its members’.28  The International Court of Justice stated that the whole of 
international law rests upon the fundamental principle of state sovereignty which prohibits 
intervention bearing on matters in which each state is permitted to decide freely.29  
Every State has a sovereign right to grant refugee status to the people who have fled from 
their country of origin to its territory.  It is an exclusively peaceful and humanitarian act 
and no other State may oppose its legitimacy under international law. 
 
                                                 
25 Jean Allain, Insisting on the Jus Cogen Nature of Non-refoulement: The Refugee Convention at fifty, 2003 
pp.85. 
26 1984 Cartagena Declaration on Refugees, Part III Para.5 
27 Ibid pp.85 
28 It states that “The Organization is based on the principle of the sovereign equality of all its Members”. 
29 Nicaragua case (Nicaragua v. United States), ICJ Judgement (Merits), 27 June 1986.   
 8
However, it remains the duty of the States to protect individuals and under international 
law this duty includes preventing individuals living on its territory from endangering the 
safety of another State. If a State grants refugee status to a persecuted foreigner, this duty 
becomes of special importance.30   This is derived from the theory of ‘due diligence’. The 
term of ‘due diligence’ has been quoted repeatedly in treaties and judicial decisions 
concerning state responsibility.    
 
According to the UN Declaration on Violence against Women, the State has a duty to 
prevent and punish acts of violence against women by State or private persons.31  The Inter 
American Convention on the Prevention, Punishment and Eradication of Violence Against 
Women also applies the ‘due diligence’ standard to prevent violence against women.32  In 
Velasquez Rodriguez v. Honduras case33, it was found that the State is responsible for the 
acts of a private person when the State fail to exercise ‘due diligence’ to prevent the 
violation or respond to it.   
The EXCOM has acknowledged the ‘due diligence’ standard in reference to the duty of a 
refugee receiving States to protect refugees.34  Even if a refugee receiving the State’s duty 
of protection is limited by the capacity of State, the State should determine in good faith as 
what is possible and reasonable. 
 
Once a States’ duty of ‘due diligence’ arises, the refugee receiving State is free to choose 
the methods by which it will meet its obligation under international law. This means that 
State responsibility will not arise as long as a refugee receiving State provides reasonably 
sufficient action for the refugee claimant.   However, international law expressly requires 
                                                 
30 L. Oppenheim, Oppenheim’s International law (5th edition 1938), vol.I  pp.539-540 
31 art.4 (C)   It states that “Exercise due diligence to prevent, investigate and, in accordance with national 
legislation, punish acts of violence against women, whether these acts are perpetrated by the state or by 
private person”. 
32 art.7 (C) 
33 Velasquez Rodriguez case, Judgment of July 29, 1988, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (Ser. C) No.4 (1988) 
34 Draft resolution, the Executive Committee of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, para.3, 
EC/SCP/26, Annex 2 (1983) 
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that a refugee receiving State shall not impose penalties, on account of their illegal entry or 
presence, on refugees who have arrived directly from a territory where their life or freedom 
was threatened.35 
 
China is a State party to the 1951 Refugee Convention and its 1967 Protocol.36  China is a 
member of the EXCOM of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees as well.  
Under these established international laws and the principle of State sovereignty which has 
been previously discussed supra, China has the right to decide whether to grant North 
Koreans to enter its territory under refugee status.  Nevertheless, North Koreans arriving in 
Chinese jurisdiction, at the borders or in the territory of China, should be treated humanely 
and be provided the proper methods of protection such as individual assessment, due 
process procedures, but should not be repatriated to their origin country where they will be 
persecuted.  
 
Once North Koreans are on its territory, China should stop forcible repatriation particularly 
against individuals facing threats of ill treatment in North Korea.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
35 art.31 of the 1951 Refugee Convention 
36 China ratified the 1951 Refugee Convention on 24 September 1982 and the 1967 Additional Protocol on 25 
September 1982.  
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2 Forcible repatriation against the principle of Non-refoulement 
 
2.1 The principle of non-refoulement 
  
Article 14 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights declares the right of everyone to 
seek asylum from persecution. Furthermore, the fundamental principle of non-refoulement 
requires that persons fleeing from persecution must be provided with an opportunity to seek 
refugee status, those in fear of torture may not be returned to their home country and 
protection must be provided against inhuman and degrading treatment.  This is a core 
principle of international law.37 This principle is known as a customary international law 
and even as a peremptory norm. It is binding to the States irrespective of whether or not 
this State ratified the 1951 Refugee Convention and its 1967 Protocol.  
 
Article 33 of the 1951 Refugee Convention provides as follows:  
“No contracting State shall expel or return(refouler) a refugee in any manner whatsoever 
to the frontiers of territories where his life or freedom would be threatened on account of 
his race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political 
opinion”.   
The1951 Refugee Convention and its 1967 Protocol were both ratified by China creates 
significant obligations to protect North Korean refugees on its territory. Nonetheless, 
Article 33 of this provides the theory of non-refoulement on the Convention level. 38  
It is hard to apply North Koreans to protect them because China as a contracting party can 
decide whether to confer on North Koreans refugee status or not.  China is still categorizing 
all North Koreans as illegal migrants and harshly puts them on the list of repatriation.  In 
addition, China does not follow its obligation with the UNHCR regional office. Article 2 of 
the Refugee Protocol Relating to the States of 1967 states as follows:  
                                                 
37 Jari Pirjola, Shadows in paradise-exploring non-refoulement as an open concept, International Journal of 
Refugee Law, December 2008. pp.1 
38 Guy S. Goodwin-Gill and Jane McAdam, supra pp.208 
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“Co-operate with the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, or any 
other agency of the United Nations that may succeed it, in the exercise of its functions”.  
 
The same principle can be found in the UN Convention Against Torture and other Cruel 
Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (Convention Against Torture).  
Paragraph 1 of Article 3 of Convention Against Torture states as: 
“No State Party shall expel, return or extradite a person to another State where there are 
substantial grounds for believing that he would be in danger of being subjected to torture”. 
It guarantees that individuals have the right not to be forcibly returned to countries where 
they would be in danger of being subjected to torture.  Article 1 of this Convention defines 
the meaning of torture as any act by which severe suffering whether physical or mental is 
intentionally inflicted on a person.  China signed this Convention in 1986 and ratified it in 
1988, but it has two reservations. China does not recognize Article 20 and 30 Paragraph 
1.39 
This Convention has more substantial grounds than the 1951 Refugee Convention for 
determination and providing protection to North Koreans because it prevents the 
repatriation of individuals who could be subjected to torture, yet the applicant has to prove 
that there is a risk of being tortured after repatriation and it requires higher degree of 
persecution compared to the 1951 Refugee Convention. 
 
Similarly, Article 7 of ICCPR provides that:  
“No one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or 
punishment. In particular, no one shall be subjected without his free consent to medical or 
scientific experimentation”.   
It is not limited to refugees and is binding to the States parties regardless of whether or not 
they are a party to the 1951 Refugee Convention and its 1967 Protocol. 
                                                 
39 See The North Korean Refugee Crisis, supra pp.47.  China does not recognize the competence of the UN 
Committee against Torture to investigate and respond to allegations of torture in a party’s territory(as 
provided for in Article 20), and China does not consider itself bound by the provision concerning arbitration 
or referral to the International Court of Justice(Para.1 of Article 30). 
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The UN Human Rights Committee has interpreted this Article 7 to incorporate the principle 
of non-refoulement and provided that States parties must not expose individuals to the 
danger of torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment upon returning to 
another country by way of their extradition, expulsion or refoulement.40  
 
Non-refoulement is also embodied in regional instruments such as the Article II (3) of the 
1969 OAU Convention, the Article 22(8) of the 1969 American Convention on Human 
Rights and the Article 12(3) of the 1981 African Charter of Human and Peoples’ Rights. 
In 1977, the EXCOM noted and reaffirmed that:  
“The fundamental importance of the observance of the principle of non-refoulement-both at 
the border and within the territory of a State-of persons who may be subjected to 
persecution if returned to their country of origin irrespective of whether or not they have 
been formally recognized as refugees”.41 
 
2.2 The Status of North Korean refugees42 in China 
 
2.2.1 The scope of North Korean refugees in China 
There is no official survey or reliable statistics for the North Koreans because China 
considered North Koreans to be criminals and or illegal migrants. Most North Koreans hide 
in rural areas and women live with local Chinese men in silence.  
In 1998-1999, the South Korean NGO, Good Friends surveyed the scope of North Korean 
refugees in China. Other NGOs and scholars added a partial survey which they based on 
the Good Friends’ survey.  
 
                                                 
40 See UN Human Rights Committee, General Comment No.20: Replaces General Comment 7 Concerning 
Prohibition of Torture and Cruel Treatment or Punishment (Art.7) (1992) para.9. 
41 See UNHCR Executive Committee Conclusion No.6 (1977). It was suggested by UK Court of Appeal in R. 
(European Roma Rights Centre) v. Immigration Officer at Prague Airport (2004) QB 811 para.44. 
42 The use of term ‘Refugee’ does not mean that these persons meet the legal standard for being refugees 
under the 1951 Refugee Convention. 
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 (a) Location 
The majority of North Korean refugees live in Jilin province located in the north-east part 
of China because it borders North Korea. It is also home to two million Korean-Chinese or 
Chinese citizens of Korean descent, and Korean is widely spoken there.  Many ethnic 
Koreans who live in China also have relatives in North Korea. Some of people who live 
near the border are engaged in small business trade between North Korea and China.  
Nonetheless, this borderline has been deteriorated and heavily controlled after 1990 
because hundreds of thousands North Koreans had used this border to escape from their 
home country.43 
 
(b) Numbers of North Korean refugees 
It is hard to estimate refugee numbers because the most North Koreans are in hiding and 
some of them only stayed in China for the short term. It also can be due to the fact that 
official survey statistics do not exist.  The Good Friends’44 survey, mentioned above, states 
that between November 1998 and April 1999, when the famine was at its peak, there were 
between 143,000 and 195,000 refugees in north-east China. The South Korean press puts 
the figure around 300,000 refugees.45  The U.S. State Department estimated the figure to be 
in the range of between 30,000 to 125,000.  The UNHCR also uses between 30,000 and 
50,000 as a working figure, but it has not been given access to the country to conduct a 
systemic survey.46 
 
(c) Gender statistics 
                                                 
43 Appendix A, the map of North Korea and Northeast China 
44 Good Friend is a Non Governmental Organization (NGO) based on Seoul South Korea. It is well known as 
helping North Korean Refugees and did such prominent research work. 
45 Andrei Lankov, North Korean Refugees in Northeast China, Asian Survey  Vol.44, University of California 
Press (November/December 2004) pp.860. 
46 United States CRS Report for Congress, North Korean Refugees in China and Human Rights Issues (Sep. 
26, 2007), pp.4 
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The statistics regarding North Korean women and their situation come primarily from the 
Good Friends’ survey in 1998 and unfortunately, there is no other reliable survey other than 
this for providing gender in formation.  According to this survey in 1998, women formed 
51.9% of refugees and the majority of them lived with Chinese men.47 This ratio has 
increased in a few years. According to the Amnesty International Report 2007, the 75% of 
refugees formed by women, however this figure is not based on reliable statistics.48  
 
2.2.2 North Koreans’ human rights situation in China 
 (a) Deprivation of the right to work 
Some local Chinese households regard North Koreans as being the same as slaves. They 
provide shelter and force North Koreans to take on a heavy work load that is low-paid or 
unpaid. They are able to take advantage of the North Koreans because they know that 
North Koreans are considered to be criminals and subjected to repatriation by Chinese 
authorities and thus exploit them. 
One of the legal instruments binding on China is the 1951 Refugee Convention and its 
1967 Protocol.  Article 17 of the 1951 Refugee Convention provides that States shall 
accord to a refugee the right to work as accorded to other aliens. However, China does not 
publically consider North Koreans as refugees under this Convention and has repatriated 
them constantly. 
Article 2 of the ICCPR is also ensured ‘right to work’ without any discrimination, but it is 
only a signatory meaning because China has not ratified it yet.49 The treaty does not have 
any binding effect without State ratification as a contracting party. 
 
(b) North Korean women and sexual violence50 
                                                 
47 Ibid pp.860 
48 Amnesty International Report 2007-North Korea, CRS Report adopted this at supra pp.4. 
49 China just signed the ICCPR on 5th of October 1998 
50 The term of ‘sexual violence’ is used to cover all forms of sexual threat, assault, interference and 
exploitation, including ‘statutory rape’ and molestation without physical harm or penetration. 
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The sexual exploitation of North Korean women includes a wide range of situations. In 
cases of trafficking, women could be forced into marriage or the sex trade. Testimonies 
from trafficked women indicate that many of them remain because they feel helpless and 
powerless to change their situation even though some women have tried to escape from 
exploitative situations.51 
 
With regard to sexual exploitation, Article 6 of Convention on the Elimination of All 
Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW)52 provides as follows that:  
“State Parties shall take all appropriate measures, including legislation, to suppress all 
forms of traffic in women and exploitation of prostitution of women”.    
It also notes in the preamble that refugee women are especially vulnerable to violence.   
 
North Korean women are often targeted by organized gangsters. Human hunters and 
traffickers have kidnapped North Korean women and sold them to Chinese men or to the 
sexual industry. They provide North Korean women to local Chinese men who live in rural 
areas. The price range for the women varies and depends on age.  Single and young North 
Koreans were sold for roughly 3000-5000 Yuan (US $400-600).53   Some North Korean 
women allow a third party to sell them as brides to Chinese men because they are desperate 
to survive. These arranged marriages are organized by brokers.  
 
Nonetheless, living with a local Chinese man does not guarantee a North Korean woman’s 
status. They are still illegal migrants even though they have entered into marriage with 
local Chinese man, have lived with him for several years and had a child. They are 
physically and sexually abused by their spouses.  They are beaten, abused and treated like a 
sexual toy. As indicated by Human Rights Watch, there are many sexual abuse cases of 
                                                 
51 Conference summery records, 7th Conference of New Approaches North Korea on North Korean Human 
Rights & Refugees (2006, Bergen Norway) pp.69. 
52 China has ratified this convention on 1980. 
53 Andrei Lankov, supra pp.86l.  See also North Korean Refugee Crisis, supra pp.23 Table-10. 
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North Korean women who were adducted in order to be sold to Chinese by organized 
gangsters.54  
 
  (c) North Korean Children in family separation and vagrancy  
Children are the future hope of our international community, and it is a common 
understanding of every States to promote and protect the rights of the child.  As stated in 
Article 22 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child55:  
 “States Parties shall take appropriate measures to ensure that a Child who is seeking 
refugee status or who is considered a refugee in accordance with applicable international 
or domestic law and procedures shall, whether unaccompanied or accompanied by his or 
her parents or by any other person, receive appropriate protection and humanitarian 
assistance in the enjoyment of applicable rights set forth in the present Convention and in 
other international human rights or humanitarian instruments to which the said States are 
Parties”.   
 
It also has to be pointed out that Children are particularly vulnerable to sexual abuses by 
human traffickers, smugglers, security officers and border guards.56   China has an 
obligation to protect the North Korean child from all forms of sexual exploitation and 
sexual abuse as indicated by Article 34 of the Convention on the Rights of Child. 
 
There is no reliable report regarding the situation of North Korean children in China, but 
the NGO, Good Friends described a part of the story.  One example, it is the tragedy of a 
family that crossed the border together and was separated. The father was repatriated, the 
mother was sold into prostitute and the children wandered in the street. They stayed and 
begged in markets, train stations in towns that were close to border. If they were lucky then 
                                                 
54 The Invisible Exodus, supra pp.13 
55 China signed this Convention on 29 August 1990 and ratified on 2 March 1992. 
56 UNHCR, Sexual Violence Against Refugees: Guidelines on Prevention and Response, Geneva 1995. 
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they found shelter and were supported from people who were willing to take them to a third 
country for freedom.57   
 
  (d) The Prevalence of distress58 
Distress is a psychological response to an event with death or injury threatening that entails 
a sense of re-experiencing the trauma and the intrusion of memories of feelings, a pattern 
of avoidance, a numbing of responsiveness, or reduced involvement in the external world, a 
persistent state of physiological arousal, reflected by such problems as difficulty sleeping, 
startle responses and angry outbursts.59   
 
Sexual exploitation may bring about intergenerational effects on mental health, particularly 
where a woman’s self-hatred and lack of self-esteem is strengthened by an unintended 
pregnancy. If the mother gives birth, she may suffer from post-partum depression and 
consequently abuse or mistreat the child, who may in turn experience their own feelings of 
mistrust and lack of self-worth.60 
 
North Korean women and girls, especially, have suffered severe trauma because each one 
has the terrible pressure of repatriation, forced non-paid work, isolation, sexual abuse and 
hostility in China.  As reported by the Untied States Human Right Committee, depression 
and grief is common reactions to North Korean women and it is related to feeling down, 
sad, hopeless and despairing.61   
 
                                                 
57 Good-Friends, Report on Daily and Human Rights of North Korean Food Refugees in China (June 1999), 
pp.28-30. 
58 It is too much details, but it has to be pointed out to understand North Korean women’s situation in China 
59 Royce Bernstein, Sex for food in a Refugee Economy: Human Rights implications and Accountability, 
Georgetown Immigration law, journal 14. Geo. Immigr. L.J. (1997) pp.1007-1009 
60 Ibid pp.1007 
61 The North Korean Refugee Crisis, supra, pp24-25 
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As stated in the UNHCR’s Sexual Violence Guidelines, China on whose territory the 
sexual violence and exploitation has occurred is responsible for taking diligent remedial 
measures, including conducting a thorough investigations into the crime, identifying and 
prosecuting those responsible persons, and protecting victims from reprisals.62 
 
2.3 Forcible repatriation against the principle of non-refoulement 
 
 2.3.1 Arrest and detention 
When Chinese authorities arrest North Koreans, they first hold them at a detention facility. 
China has several border detention centres due to North Korean refugees. Sexual, physical 
abuse and torture occur in the detention centres.63 These days China intensively searches 
and finds hidden North Koreans and brutally takes them to detention centres.64   
 
After receiving these detainees from Chinese authorities, the North Korean security agency 
interrogates the detainees to distinguish persons who have committed political crimes from 
those who merely crossed the border searching for food.  Border crossing without any 
permission is considered a politically sensitive crime. In particular, women with a previous 
record of crossing the border or who have married a Chinese man or who are pregnant face 
harsh penalties. Contact with South Koreans, foreign missionaries or humanitarian workers 
are regarded as a serious crime and the persons who commit this crime are sent to a 
political labour camp.  In extreme cases, they face public execution.65  
 
2.3.2 Detention of humanitarian workers 
                                                 
62 UNHCR Sexual Violence Against Refugee, supra para. 9 
63 Conference summary records, 7th Conference of New Approaches North Korea on North Korean Human 
Rights & Refugees (2006 Bergen Norway) pp.70.  
64 The Invisible Exodus, supra pp.16 
65 Good-Friends and Amnesty International press release on May 6 2008, supra. 
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There are an increasing number of reports that China has detained many humanitarian 
workers who were helping North Koreans.66 Because they assisted North Koreans, they 
were arrested, detained, maltreated and expelled.  Some of them were accused of espionage 
by the Chinese authorities. 
In one instance in 2002, a group of foreign and Chinese nationals stood trial for ‘people 
smuggling’ in Jilin province in China.  The group included a South Korean pastor, a 
Korean-American, four North Korean citizens, and 12 Chinese nationals. All these 
individuals had allegedly been involved in staging the escapes of North Koreans.67 In May 
2003, South Korean citizen Choi Young-Hun was sentenced to five years in prison for his 
role in assisting North Koreans in China.68 Chinese authorities also detained American 
citizen Phillip J. Buck on May 9, 2005 for assisting North Koreans in China.69 
 
2.3.3 Forcible repatriation 
The UN Special Rapporteur stated as follows that: 
“The former (illegal immigrants) implies that they can be sent back to their country of 
origin, while the latter (refugees) are protected by the principle of non-refulement. I submit 
that a key test is whether they are protected by their country of origin. If they are not, this 
should open the door to international protection and legitimize their classification as 
refugee. Even if some countries are not ready to classify them openly as refugee, these 
persons should at least be treated as persons in need of international protection, and basic 
international law principles, such as non-refoulement, should be applied”.70 
 
                                                 
66 Shim Jae-Yun, Over 100 Korean Missionaries Detained in China in The Korea Times (June 20, 2002)  
67 Andrei Lankov, supra pp.870   See also U.S. House of Representative Hearing, supra pp.74. 
68 The Untied Nations Working Group on Arbitrary Detention ruled Choi’s deprivation of liberty as arbitrary. 
UNWGAD, Opinion No. 20/2005 (People’s Republic of China), 11 June 2004 
69 US Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 2005 Annual Report pp.113-115 
70 See Elim Chan & Andreas Schloenhardt, supra pp.222. They quoted it from UN Special Rapporteur: Mr. 
Vitit Muntarbhorn’s statement. 
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China does not consider North Koreans as refugees under the 1951 Refugee Convention 
and forcibly repatriates them to horrible place where they routinely face imprisonment, 
torture and sometimes execution.  By 2004, China had repatriated at least 5,000 North 
Koreans, and was reported as permitting North Korean security forces periodically to enter 
China to abduct refugees.71 
According to one North Korean’s testimony who escaped to China, he alleged that:   
“I had seen almost four hundred North Koreans repatriated from China during my stay in 
Musan”.72 
The 2004 World Refugee Survey also stated that China has forcibly returned as many as 
200 North Koreans per week amounting to an estimated 7,800 forced deportations during 
2003.73 
 
As already discussed, there are constant reports about how North Koreans were mistreated, 
tortured and executed when they were repatriated by Chinese Officials. 
Here is more evidence from the prison camp survivor: 
“In the gulags there are many persecutions….I have witnessed people losing their 
eyes….And also I have seen people lose their arms and legs because they were beaten so 
hard”.74 
Another witness, a former North Korean prison guard and refugee in China, stated before 
the United States House of Representatives: 
“The accused are severely beaten, tortured, and threatened to obtain their confessions. A 
place where a human is not treated as human and yet worse than animals is the North 
                                                 
71 Guy S. Goodwin-Gill and Jane McAdam, supra pp.232 
72 The Invisible Exodus, supra frontpage 
73 See Testimony to The Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific, U.S. House of Representatives, Committee 
on International Relations (April 28 2005) pp.6. 
74 See Statement of Kim Tae-Jin, North Korea Prison Camp survivor and former refugee in China. There are 
more evidences from the testimony of North Korea specialist and prison camp survivors before U.S. House 
Representative Hearing, supra pp.100. 
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Korea’s Political Prison Camp. ‘Living Hell’ would be a right description for those 
prisoners”.75 
 
As mentioned above, Article 14 of UDHR provides the right to seek and enjoy asylum 
from persecution and Article 7 of ICCPR prohibited repatriation to where persons would be 
exposed inhuman and degrading treatment. Article 3 of Convention Against Torture 
prevents acts of torture and imposed an obligation to a contracting party that it should not 
return persons to their origin country where they would be in danger of being subjected to 
torture.    
It is perfectly clear that China has a right to exercise its measurement of State sovereignty 
for protecting its national security and borderline. However, it should be balanced with 
China’s obligation under international law.  International Law strongly prohibits 
repatriating persons who likely to face torture or cruel, inhumane or degrading treatment 
upon returning to another country. 
 
2.4 Exceptions to the principle of non-refoulement 
 
2.4.1 The 1951 Refugee Convention 
The 1951 Convention refugee definition is not an absolute guarantee of protection because 
the principle of non-refoulement in Article 33 of this Convention is subjected to exceptions 
such as ‘public order’ and ‘National security’.  Article 33(2) of the 1951 Refugee 
Convention expressly provides that the benefit of non-refoulement may not be claimed by a 
refugee for whom there are reasonable grounds regarding them as a danger to the security 
of the country or who has been convicted by a final judgment of a particularly serious 
crime and constitutes a danger to the community of that country.  In such situations, the 
danger to the country must be very serious.  Furthermore, it has to be a rational connection 
between the removal of the refugee and the elimination of the danger. Refoulement should 
                                                 
75 See Statement of Choi Dong-Chul, Former North Korean Prison Guard and Refugee in China, U.S. House 
Representative Hearing, supra pp.101-104. 
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be last possible resort to eliminate the danger, and the danger to the country of refugee has 
to outweigh the risk to the refugee upon refoulement.76   
 
The exceptions to non-refoulement are framed in terms of the individual, and whether 
he/she may be considered a security risk is necessarily left very much to the judgement of 
the State authorities.77 
A Chinese Foreign Ministry official stated on the behalf of their practice to prevent North 
Koreans from entering foreign compounds that:  
“Such asylum bids not only harm the security of those embassies and interfere with their 
normal function, but also pose a challenge to the Chinese Law and interfere with security 
and stability in China”.78 
Unfortunately, the concept of national security remains undefined under international law. 
However, it should be interpreted in good faith. Article 31(1) of the Vienna Convention on 
the Law of Treaties describes that: 
 “A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be 
given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its objects and purpose”. 
China must demonstrate ‘reasonable grounds’ for believing that North Koreans are a 
danger to China’s security by adducing evidence of a future risk.  As mentioned above, 
only a very serious danger to national security should justify refoulement.79 .   
 
In the case of Suresh80, the Supreme Court of Canada concluded that international law 
generally rejects deportation to torture, even where national security interests are at stake. 
This case also discussed that individualized decisions should be made in keeping with due 
                                                 
76 Silver& Others v United Kingdom, European Commission of Human Rights (1981) 3 EHRR 475 11 
October 1980 
77 Guy S. Goodwin-Gill and Jane McAdam, supra pp.235 
78 Harvey Stockwin, China Escalates Hardline on Refugees, Times of India, June 15, 2002 
79 Sir Eilhu Lauterpacht &Daniel Bethlehem, The Scope and Content of the principle of Non-refoulement: 
Opinion, notes169 
80 See Suresh v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), Supreme Court of Canada, (200) SCC1, 
11 Jan. 222. 
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process standards by a competent authority with appropriate expertise in refugee and 
criminal law.  In A v. Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs81, it was held that 
the principle statement of exclusion in article 33(2) is that the individual constitutes a 
danger to the community or to national security, not that he/she has been convicted of a 
particularly serious crime.   
 
China as a contracting party in the 1951 Refugee Convention has an obligation to interpret 
Article 33(2) in good faith as indicated by its purpose. The threat to ‘national security’ as 
exception to non-refoulement obligation has to be interpreted restrictively and with full 
respect to the principle of proportionality discussed supra. China also has an obligation to 
establish fair and efficient asylum procedures derive from the right to seek and enjoy 
asylum.  
 
North Korean refugees have to be identified in need of international protection, but China 
does categorizing North Koreans as criminals and considered them to harmful to Chinese 
national security without any individual assessment and identification procedure.  
 
2.4.2 The Convention Against Torture 
The Convention Against Torture guarantees the principle of non-refoulement as absolute 
right granted to any persons in danger of being subjected to torture. It applies to persons 
who have entered a country illegally as well as lawfully.  In the case of Mutombo v. 
Switzerland82, the Committee Against Torture has concluded that the principle of non-
refoulement under Article 3 of Torture Convention applies not only direct expulsion, 
refoule and/or extradition but also to indirect transfer to a third country.   
 
In spite of that, the applicant must prove ‘substantial grounds for believing’ that persons 
would be in danger of being subjected to torture.  ‘Substantial grounds for believing’ 
                                                 
81 A v. Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (1999) FCA 227, para.4. 
82 Mutombo v Switzerland, Committee Against Torture, Communication No.13/1993, UN Doc.A/49/44 at 45 
(1994) 
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requires both that subjectively the applicant faces the danger of torture and objectively the 
belief must based on substantial grounds. In the case of Ismail Alan v. Switzerland83, the 
Committee Against Torture can decide whether there are substantial grounds for believing 
that the applicant would be in danger of being subjected to torture upon return.  The 
applicant must establish ‘substantial grounds for believing’ by credible, direct and specific 
evidence. But, it does not require complete accuracy from the applicant’s testimony. In 
Khan v. Canada84, the Committee also noted as follows that: 
“Even if there could be some doubt the facts as adduced by the applicant, it must ensure 
that his security is not endangered”. 
 
2.4.3 The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) 
Like Article 3 of Convention Against Torture, Article 7 of ICCPR is also an absolute 
provision. Article 4(2) of ICCPR forbids derogation even in times of public emergencies. 
However, United Nation Human Rights Committee has issued very few decisions on the 
principle of non-refoulement under this provision. In a number of cases applicants have 
claimed that their extradition to countries where they faced capital punishment or would be 
a risk of torture constituted a violation of Article 7.85  In addition, it is not require the 
exhaustion of domestic remedies if those ones are unreasonably prolonged.  However, the 
decision of Human Rights Committee based on this provision is not legally binding.   
                                                 
83 Ismail Alan v Switzerland, Committee Against Torture, Communication No.21/1995, UN Doc. 
CAT/C/16/D/21/1995 (1996) 
84 Tahir Hussain Khan v Canada, Committee against Torture, Communication No.15/1994, UN Doc.A/50/44 
(1995) 
85 David Weissbrodt &Isabel Hortreiter, The Principle of Non-refoulement: Article 3 of the Convention 
Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment in Comparison with the 
Non-refoulement Provisions of Other International Human Rights Treaties, Buffalo Human Rights Law 
Review Vol.5, 1999 pp.43. 
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3 The State Responsibility of China for the North Korean Refugees 
 
3.1 China’s duty of protection against refoulement 
 
According to Article 2 of Charter of the United Nations86, China must refrain, in its 
international relations, from any manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United 
Nations to maintain international peace and security.  Obviously, it is a serious breach of 
International law if China consistently repatriates North Koreans.  Because, international 
law strongly prohibits forcibly refoule persons where they face persecution, torture and/or 
inhuman treatment whether or not they are qualified as refugees. It is generally recognized 
by State practice, international scholars and publicists as ‘peremptory norm’.  There is no 
derogation admissible not only at the international but also at the national level. 
 
International law sets a binding obligation to China that it should abstain from sending 
North Koreans into their home country of alleged persecution, and has to provide some sort 
of procedure to protect North Koreans against refoulement.  Article 40 of International Law 
Commission states as follows that: 
“….a State of an obligation arising under a peremptory norm of general international 
law…a breach of such an obligation is serious if it involves a gross or systematic failure by 
responsible State to fulfil the obligation”. 
This obligation intends to protect the most basic human values.87  The term ‘serious’ 
signifies that a certain order of magnitude of violation is necessary in order not to trivialize 
the breach. It is not intended to suggest that any violation of this obligation is not serious or 
is somehow excusable.88 
 
China’s duty to protect North Koreans arises as soon as the individual or group flee from 
North Korea for relevant reasons and come within the Chinese jurisdiction regardless of 
                                                 
86 art.2 para.4 
87 Draft articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts with commentaries 2001 pp.112 
88 Ibid  pp.113 
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whether the refugee status has been formally determined or not.  China is never entitled to 
immunity from any act that contravenes this duty of protection, regardless of where or 
against whom that act was perpetrated. 
 
3.2 State responsibility in general  
 
The essential characteristics of State responsibility hinge upon certain basic factors: firstly, 
the existence of an international legal obligation; secondly, there has to have occurred an 
act or omission which violates that obligation and which is imputable to the state 
responsible; and finally, that loss or damages have resulted from the unlawful act or 
omission.89 
 
Article 1 of the ILC Draft Articles on State Responsibility reiterates the general rule, 
widely supported by practice90, that every internationally wrongful act of a state entails 
responsibility.  Article 2 provides that there is an internationally wrongful act of a state 
when the conduct consisting of an action or omission is attributable to the state under 
international law and constitutes a breach of an international obligation of the state.91 
 
The violation of a State obligation could be considered as a lawful act under its domestic 
law, but its characterization as an act of intentionally wrong is governed by international 
law and thus is not affected by the characterization of the same acts as lawful by domestic 
law.92   Article 12 stipulates that there is a breach of an international obligation when an act 
                                                 
89 Malcolm N. Shaw, supra pp.696 
90 ILC Commentary 2001, pp.63. 
91 art. 2 of International Law Commission’s (ILC) draft articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally 
Wrongful Acts on Augst 10, 2001. 
92 See Ibid art.3. It states that “The characterization of an act of a State as internationally wrongful is 
governed by international law. Such characterization is not affected by the characterization of the same act as 
lawful by internal law.” 
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of that state is not in conformity with what is required of it by that obligation, regardless of 
its origin or character.93  
 
The Spanish Zone of Morocco case94provides that:  
“It is the necessary corollary of a right. All rights of an international character involve 
international responsibility.  Responsibility results in the duty to make reparation if the 
obligation in question in not met”.   
The Permanent Court of International Justice mentioned in the Chorzow Factory case95 
that:  
“It is a principle of international law and even a greater conception of law, that any breach 
of an engagement involves an obligation to make reparation”.  
 
The State responsibility also occurs from violation of ‘community obligation’ considered as 
‘peremptory norm’ under international law.96  It aims to protect such fundamental values as 
peace, human rights, or self-determination of peoples or an obligation erga ommes 
contractantes that is laid down in a multilateral treaty safeguarding those fundamental 
values.97   Furthermore, States that take action to invoke this responsibility pursue a 
community interest, for they act on behalf of the international community or of the plurality 
of States parties to the multilateral treaty.  All States are entitled to demand the compliance 
with the obligation that has been infringed and could take a host of remedial actions 
designed to impel the delinquent State to cease its wrongdoing or to make reparation.98 
 
3.3 Breach of an international obligation 
                                                 
93 Ibid art.12 
94 The Spanish Zone of Morocco claims, 2 RIAA, p.615 (1923): 2 AD, p.157 and p.641 
95 The Chorzow Factory case (Germany v. Poland), PCIJ, Series A, No.17, 1928. 
96 See Ibid art.40 para.1. It states that “This chapter applies to the international responsibility which is entailed 
by a serious breach by a State of an obligation arising under a peremptory norm of general international law.” 
97 Antonio Cassese, International Law (Second Edition) 2005, pp.262. 
98 Ibid pp.263 
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State responsibility occurs when the act of a State is a breach of international obligation 
under the general international law or lex specialis pursuant to Article 55 of the ILC Draft 
articles.99  It means that the special rules of international law will prevail if any 
inconsistency arises between ILC Draft articles and the special rules of international law on 
the matter of state responsibility.  Further, Article 56 preserves the rules of international 
customary law and also other rules of international law.100  The breach of an international 
obligation does not always need to have damages to the States. It may happen in a form of 
written rules such as a treaty or other form of non-written rules of international law such as 
customary law, general principles of international law or unilateral act.101  
 
As discussed supra, under the international law, China has an obligation to protect North 
Koreans and should stop repatriating them to where they will be persecuted.   Nonetheless, 
China does not consider North Koreans as refugees and does not provide any protection to 
them.  China treated North Koreans as criminals and/or illegal migrants pursuant to 
domestic law and the bilateral extradition treaty between China and North Korean 
government.  However, in the event of a discrepancy between the international treaty 
(multilateral treaty such as human rights treaties) and domestic Chinese law, bilateral treaty, 
the international treaty takes precedence unless China entered a reservation upon ratifying 
or acceding to it.102 
 
                                                 
99 See Ibid art.55.  It states that “these articles do not apply where and to the extent that the conditions for the 
existence of an internationally wrongful act or the content or implementation of the international 
responsibility of a State are governed by special rules of international law”. 
100 See Ibid art.56. It states that “the applicable rules of international law continue to govern questions 
concerning the responsibility of a State for an internationally wrongful act to the extent that they are not 
regulated by these articles”. 
101 Prasit Aekaputra, International Humanitarian law and State responsibility in 21st century, ISIL year book 
of international humanitarian and refugee law (New Delhi 2003), vol.3 pp.96-105. 
102 See more details in United Nations-International Human Rights Instruments, HRI/CORE/Add.21/Rev.2, 
para.51 & 53, June11 2001.  In para.52: between International treaty and domestic law, para.53: between 
international human rights agreements and domestic law.  
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It is arguable that China has complied with international law and has sufficiently 
considered the situation of North Koreans under international law, national law and 
humanitarian principles. 
China’s Foreign Affair’s spokesmen commented as follows that:  
“It is true that there are some North Korea citizens who have made illegal entry into China 
along the China-North Korea border in recent years. However, they are not refugees either 
from the perspective of international law or judging the reason why they crossed the 
border. China has handled this question in accordance with international practice and the 
relevant laws of China, while taking into account humanitarianism and peace and stability 
of the Korean Peninsula”.103   
China’s core document, filed at United Nations described that, once China has approved an 
international treaty, it is binding under Chinese law and China must honour the 
corresponding obligation.104   
 
As already discussed in Chapter 1, it is also a basic principle of international law that States 
have a ‘due diligence’ duty to implement their treaty obligations in good faith.105 This duty 
is breached if a combination of acts or omissions has the overall effect of rendering the 
fulfilment of treaty obligations obsolete, or defeating the object and purpose of a treaty.106  
In the Nuclear Tests case107, good faith is regarded as one of the basic principles governing 
the creation and performance of legal obligations.  In the Norwegian Loans case108, it was 
also considered as general principle of international law.  
  
                                                 
103 See Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, Spokesperson’s Comment on the 
Reported Turning Over of Seven DPRK Illegal Immigrants by Russia (Dec. 1, 2000), took from Stanford 
Journal of International Law 2004 supra pp.149-150. 
104 United Nations-International Human Rights Instruments, supra para.51 
105 art.26, 31 of 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 
106 Guy S. Goodwin and Jane McAdam, supra pp.387. 
107 Nuclear Tests case (Australia v France), ICJ Reports, (1974), 253, 268, para.46 
108 Certain Norwegian Loans, ICJ Reports, (1957), para.53. 
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In the event of applying international law, China simply categorized North Koreans as 
criminal and/or illegal migrants without any individual assessment.  Even though China has 
ratified the 1951 Refugee Convention and the Convention Against Torture, it does not 
follow it.  Nevertheless, those international instruments have a binding effect on the 
Chinese law enforcement and the judicial organs, and those Conventions could be invoked 
before the Chinese courts in practice as well.109   Indicated by Article 33 of the 1951 
Refugee Convention and Article 3 of Convention Against Torture, it is prohibited to 
repatriate anyone to a territory where he/she likely will be tortured, but China constantly 
repatriates North Koreans even though a lot of evidence has showed North Koreans are 
being tortured brutally after repatriation to their home country.   
 
It was fully discussed on the North Koreans human rights situation in China.  China also 
has violated its responsibilities under Article 6 of Convention on the CEDAW110 and 
Article 22, 34 and 35 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child,111 because of China 
failure’s to protect North Korean women and children from severe human rights abuses.  
Other applicable Articles are Article 2 (1) of the ICCPR112and the 1949 Convention on the 
Suppression of Trafficking in Persons and of the Exploitation of the Prostitution of 
Others.113 Nevertheless, they do not have a binding effect on China because of the lack of 
ratification.  
 
                                                 
109 See more details at United Nations: Convention against Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading 
Treatment or Punishment, Summary record of the 419th Meeting of the U.N. Committee Against Torture: 
China and Poland. 
110 See art.6.  It states that “States Parties shall take all appropriate measures, including legislation, to 
suppress all forms of traffic in women and exploitation of prostitution of women”. 
111 See art.34 and 35.  It states that “States Parties undertake to protect the child from all forms of sexual 
exploitation and sexual abuse…”, “States Parties shall take all appropriate national, bilateral and multilateral 
measures to prevent the abduction of, the sale of or traffic in children for any purpose or in any form”. 
112 art.2 para.1 
113 art.6 
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Article 32 of Chinese Constitution provides the right of asylum, but it does not have any 
national implementation system for granting refugee status.114  China allowed Indo-
Chinese refugees and Burmese in as refugees on Humanitarian grounds, but China does not 
want to extend this principle to North Koreans asylum seekers. Instead, China arrests and 
repatriates North Koreans without conferring on them any opportunity to seek asylum.  
 
3.4 Attribution of obligation to China 
 
In general practice, State responsibility for the breach of an international obligation arises 
when a wrongful act is attributable to the State.  Article 4 of the ILC articles provides that 
the conduct of any state organ shall be considered an act of the state concerned under 
international law where the organ exercised legislative, executive, judicial or any other 
function, whatever position it holds in the organization of the State and whatever its 
character as an organ of the central government or of a territorial unit of the State.  
 
The form of attribution could vary according to the nature of the wrongful act. An example 
of State responsibility is described by the Nicaragua case.115  The International Court of 
Justice found in this case that agent’ acts which included the laying of mines in Nicaraguan 
internal or territorial waters and the certain attacks on Nicaraguan ports, oil installations 
and a naval base were imputable to the United States.  
Another example of State responsibility is the Corfu Channel case,116 where Albania was 
held responsible for the consequences of mine-laying in its territorial waters on the basis of 
knowledge possessed by that State as to the presence of such mines. 
 
                                                 
114 See art.32. It states that “the People’s Republic of China protects the lawful rights and interests of 
foreigners within Chinese territory; foreigners on Chinese territory must abide by the laws of People’s 
Republic of China. The People’s Republic of China may grant asylum to foreigners who request it for 
political reasons”. 
115 Nicaragua case, supra para.14 
116 The Corfu channel case (United Kingdom v. Albania), ICJ Decision 9 April 1949 
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The fact that the harm caused by State action may be inflicted outside the territory of the 
actor, or in an area identified by municipal law as an international zone, in no way 
diminishes the responsibility of the State.117 
 
Under general principles of international law, China’s State responsibility could occur 
directly where the domestic legal and administrative systems fail to enforce or guarantee 
the observance of international standards.118   
As discussed above, China does not comply with international standards in order to protect 
North Koreans, not even the provisions of the 1951 Refugee Convention, Convention 
Against Torture and several human rights instruments that have binding effect on China.  
 
3.5 Legal consequences of violation of international law 
 
In general the legal consequences of States for a breach of an international obligation are 
that they are normally under the obligation to cease that act, if it is continuous and to offer 
appropriate assurances and guarantees of non-repetition, if circumstances so require.119   
However, in the breach of ‘community obligation’, the legal consequences of the wrongful 
act no longer consist merely of a ‘bilateral relation’ between the responsible State and the 
State victim of the wrongful act, but of a ‘community relation’ between the wrongdoer and 
all other States because it concerns a fundamental value which is owed to all the other 
members of the international community such as peace, human rights, self-determination of 
peoples, the principle of non-refoulement.120  In addition, other States are under the 
obligation not to recognize as lawful the situation created by the breach, not to render aid or 
assistance to the responsible State in maintaining the situation so created, and to co-operate 
as far as possible to bring the breach to an end.121  
                                                 
117 Guy S. Goodwin-Gill and Jane McAdam, supra pp.244 
118 Ian Brownile, supra pp.431-444 
119 Ibid art.30 
120 Antonio Cassese, supra pp.272-273 
121 Ibid 40 & 41 
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Consistent with this idea, all States could bring a claim for invoking the State responsibility 
of China, demand cessation and request assurance of non-repetition.122 If China has not 
taken immediate action to protect North Koreans, all States have the right to bring this 
matter to a competent international body such as the United Nations.  If an international 
body does not act fairly or its action has not resulted in protection for North Koreans in 
China, all States then have rights to take peaceful countermeasures under international 
law.123  However, before taking countermeasures, the claimant States should offer to 
negotiate with the responsible State as well as to propose other means of peacefully settling 
the dispute such as mediation and conciliation, if appropriate, or arbitral or judicial 
settlement and to duly notify the responsible State of their intention to resort to 
countermeasures.124  
 
It is possible that the United Nations Security Council could consider North Korean’s 
situation in China as a violation of community obligation that amount to a breach of peace 
and it may decide which measures to use to find a solution in accordance with Article 41 of 
the Charter of the United Nations. Nonetheless, it seems unrealistic as long as China sits on 
one of permanent members of the United Nations Security Council. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
122 Ibid 43  
123 Ibid the whole of Chapter II 
124 Antonio Cassese, supra pp.275 
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4 The eligibility for Refugee Status 
 
4.1 The eligibility of Refugee Status 
 
The 1951 Refugee Convention recognizes a person as a refugee if he/she; 
“owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, 
membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of 
his/her nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself/herself 
of the protection of that country”.125  
 
China repeatedly declares that North Koreans are ‘economic migrants’ and categorizes 
their actions as ‘illegal cross border’ and then returns them according to the bilateral 
extradition agreement between China and North Korean government.126  Without any 
individual identification procedures, China insists that no North Koreans have any 
qualification for refugee status under the 1951 Refugee Convention and its 1967 Protocol.  
 
As discussed supra, there are various reasons for North Koreans fleeing from their home 
country.  Some of North Koreans fled to China for the fear of political persecution and 
human rights abuses and are eligible for refugee status under the 1951 Refugee Convention. 
Some of them just cross the border in searching for food and may not return to North Korea 
due to their illegal departure which is regarded as criminal in North Korea.  This is called 
refugee sur-place and may be protected by the UNHCR mandate in its practice.127 
 
                                                 
125 art.1A (2) 
126 The North Korean Refugee Crisis, supra pp.40 
127 See UN Commission on Human Rights, Resolution 2004/13 on the Situation of Human Rights in the 
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea.  Muntarbhorn identified two main categories of North Korean 
refugees such as Conventional refugee and Mandate refugee when he stated before the UN Commission on 
Human Rights as Special Rapporteur in 2004. 
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The following discussion talks about the common arguments made under the 1951 Refugee 
Convention and its 1967 Protocol in order to determine whether the North Koreans can be 
said to have refugee status. However, the human rights situation in North Korea has to be 
explained before discussing the eligibility of refugee status. 
 
4.2 Human Rights situation in North Korea as background facts 
 
4.2.1 Unrealistic social control based on public distribution system 
After decolonization from Japan in 1949 and through the Korean Civil War from 1950-
1953, the North Korean regime imposed on its citizens to the self-reliance propaganda 
known as ‘Juche’ and tied the whole nation to the Public Distribution System (PDS).    
 
The ‘Juche’ idea is the official state ideology of North Korea. It could be translated to 
taking an ‘independent stand’ in politics, the military and the economy without the 
assistance of neighbouring countries. 128  However, North Korea had received economic 
assistance from the former Soviet Union until 1991 and China has also been giving support. 
Recently, the North Korean regime received large supplies of heavy fuel oil and technical 
assistance from neighbouring countries after six party talks. 
 
The North Korea regime has used the PDS to protect its power and oppress citizens who 
are not faithful to the regime.  The PDS is a very extensive system because approximately 
two-thirds of the 23.7 million of population depends on it for their lives.  Access to this 
system including food supplies, domestic agricultural production, imports, and aid is 
determined by person’s social status. The distribution is mainly given to government and 
ruling party officials, important military units, and urban populations, in particular, 
residents of the capital Pyongyang, as a priority.  Before the out-break of the famine, the 
PDS reportedly provided food supplies of over 700 grams per person-per day, but it has 
been cut to 250 grams per day, and continued decreasing until it was actually halted.  
                                                 
128 On-line Wikipedia http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/juche  It explains ‘Juche’ ideology as political propaganda 
same as Stalinism.  
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Food can be a strong weapon of political repression when it is closely tied to the political 
order.  The North Koreans’ fundamental rights to life have been threatened because of food 
control.129 
 
4.2.2 Severe famine 
The North Korean regime has controlled and distributed its production based on communist 
Market theory. However, this planned economic system has transitioned into an unrealistic 
and corrupt project. It led to the shortage of supply, formed the Black Market and relied on 
neighbouring countries’ assistance during the last few decades. It is also estimated that 15 
to 30 percent of North Korea’s GDP is used to support the military and to develop weapons 
even though its citizens are struggling with the food shortage.130   Following these 
sequences, the disastrous floods had stricken the country in the mid-1990s.  This has driven 
the North Korea’s economic system into paralysis and pushed North Koreans into severe 
famine resulting in an estimated two million people (ten percent of the nation’s population) 
having died of starvation and disease.  Ironically, the North Korea regime used the 
enormous standing military strength and internal security as a solution to prevent the 
starving nation from descending into chaos.131 
  
In December 1995, the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) reported that 2.1 million 
children and 500,000 pregnant women faced immediate starvation, and millions more could 
face the same the situation.132 The World Food Program (WFP) reported that it had helped 
                                                 
129 Food price in the market is extremely high and amounts to 85% of North Koreans salary. Many North 
Koreans still were threat to their life because of starvation. See also CRS Report for Congress: North Korean 
Refugees in China and Human Rights Issues (September 26, 2007). See also World Food Program (WFP) 
Annual Report 2003-North Korea pp.25. 
130 Lee Young-Sun & Yoon Deok-Ryong, The Sturcture of North Korea’s Economy: Changes and Effects, A 
New International Framework for North Korea, American Enterprise Institute, 2005 pp.52. 
131 Benjamin Nederland, Quandary on the Yalu: International law, politics, and China’s North Korean 
Refugee Crisis, Stanford Journal of International law (2004), pp.146. 
132 Marcus Noland & Sherman Robinson & Tao Wang, Famine in North Korea: Cause and Cures, Institute for 
International Economics, 2002 pp.4. 
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to feed 5.8 million desperately poor and hungry North Koreans in 2003.133  According to 
the United States Committee for Human Rights in North Korea, a third of the population 
was seriously exposed to malnutrition.134  As indicated by WFP and UNICEF’s survey, 
one-third of mothers with young children were malnourished and 37 percent of children 
under age 6 were stunted. Such malnourished children are much more likely to die as a 
result of common childhood diseases.135    
 
Due to severe food shortage, many North Koreans have been foraging for alternative food 
supplies such as roots, grasses, tree bark and stalks, all of which are poor in nutritional 
value and led to serious digestive problems. Children and the elderly, in particular, were the 
most vulnerable group in this situation.136 
 
4.2.3 The Denial of Fundamental Human Rights 
The North Korean government has ratified to the International Covenants on Civil and 
Political Rights and on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. Nevertheless, it routinely 
and egregiously violates nearly all international human rights standards.137 
 
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights fully pointed out that everyone has the right to 
freedom of opinion and expression and the right to freedom of assembly.138   The 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) expands these freedoms with 
the rights of freedom of thoughts, guarantees the right to hold opinions without interference 
                                                 
133 Ibid Report 2003. 
134 North Korean Refugee Crisis, supra pp.28 
135 Stephan Haggard & Marcus Noland, Hunger and Human Rights: The politics of Famine in North Korea, 
US Committee for Human Rights in North Korea, 2005 pp.30. 
136 Conference summary records, supra pp.68-69 
137 See UN Treaty body Database.  North Korean government signed both treaties on 14 September 1981 and 
entry into force on 14 December 1981. 
138 See art.18 to 20 
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and the right to peaceful assembly and association.139   Article 67 of North Korean 
Constitution also ensures these rights.140    
 
However, these fundamental rights do not exist in practice. There is no dissent or criticisms 
toward the Mr. Kim Jong-il regime and no organizations exists other than those created by 
the Government.  Most North Koreans have limited access to media sources. Only selected 
people can access to Internet.141    
 
There is no freedom of religion in practice even though it is protected at the Constitutional 
level in North Korea.142   Religious worship has been repressed except in Government 
supported Churches or Temples.  It was pointed out as a serious issue by the United Nation 
Human Rights Commission as well.143 
 
4.2.4 Social discrimination and Collective responsibility 
Article 7 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights states that all people are equal 
before the law and have the right to be protected by the law without any type of 
discrimination.  The ICCPR reaffirms that all persons are equal before the courts and the 
law and are entitled equal protection without any discrimination.144  The North Korean 
Constitution also recognizes the right to equality in all sectors of social life of the nation.145 
 
                                                 
139 art.9,12,18 to 22 
140 See Constitution Finder. 
 www.korea-np.co.jp/pk/062nd_issue/98092413.htm. “North Korea(DPRK)’s Socialist Constitution” which is 
issued on September 5, 1998  by Supreme People’s Assemble and is implemented on same date.  
141 U.S. Department of State, 2007 Country Reports on Human Rights practices-North Korea. It released on 
March 11, 2008. 
142 Constitution Finder supra art.68 
143 Appendix C 
144 art.14 and 26 
145 Constitution finder, supra art.65 
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However, there is no right to equality in practice.  Social discrimination and collective 
responsibility based on family background is common.  NGOs’ Line has criticized this 
social discrimination and oppression.146 
 
Family background is a measure used to determine an individual’s social level, education, 
occupation and marriage.  The North Korean regime divides its citizens into three classes, 
‘core’(28%), ‘basic’(45%), ‘complex’(27%) and 51 sub-classes based on their loyalty, 
social level and family background. The citizens who belong to the ‘complex class’ were 
assigned to dangerous or heavy-duty labour, blocked from school admissions and party 
membership, classified as being subject to surveillance and persecution and were controlled 
by forcible relocation. It is very rare for those persons in this classification to reclassify.147  
 
Collective responsibility is also a prevalent punishment in North Korea.  For example, 
when a person commits political crimes, his parents, siblings and other relatives are 
punished regardless of their individual innocence or guilt. 
 
4.2.5 No rule of law 
North Korea’s criminal code is structured on the basis of political and social considerations. 
It distinguishes political crimes from ordinary ones and hands down different levels of 
punishment.148   Crossing the border without permission was considered as a serious 
political crime, but the North Korean government revised its criminal code in 2004 and 
reduced penalties for those leaving the country for non-political reasons, such as economic 
migrants.149   
                                                 
146 Amnesty International Report 2007-North Korea. It released on May 23, 2007. 
147 White Paper on Human Rights in North Korea 2007, Table II-8  supra pp.152 
148 David Hawk, The Hidden Gulag: Exposing North Korea’s Prison Camps, US Committee for Human 
Rights in North Korea, 2001 pp.123. 
149 Failure to protect: A call for the UN Security Council to Act in North Korea, Commissioned by Vaclav 
Havel &Kjell Magne Bondevik &Elie Wiese, US Committee for Human Rights in North Korea, 2006 pp.43-
45. 
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As a State party to the ICCPR, the North Korean regime should undertake to respect and 
ensure all individuals enjoy the rights recognized in the present Covenant. It should take 
the necessary steps to adopt such laws to give effect to these rights which were ensured by 
the Covenant.150   The North Korean regime, however, doesn’t have a fair due process 
system in practice, and its citizens are arbitrarily imprisoned, tortured and executed. Public 
executions are common.151 
There are approximately 150,000 to 200,000 people in the concentration camp as political 
prisoners.  It is reported that those people are extremely mistreated and are unable to 
survive under such terrible conditions.152  As indicated by the testimony of An Myong-chol, 
an ex-guard at a political prisoners’ camp in North Korea, there are special secret prison 
camps using prisoners for testing a variety of chemicals, and in biological and industrial 
experiments.153    
 
The UN Human Right Commission is also concerned about continuing reports of systemic, 
widespread and grave violations of human rights in North Korea.154 
 
4.2.6 The denial of the right to travel and Freedom of residence 
The freedom of movement and residence is ensured in Article 13 of the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights. It provides as follows that: 
“Everyone has the right to freedom of movement… to leave any country… and to return to 
his or her country.” 
                                                 
150 art.2(1),(2) 
151 Good-Friends, South Korean NGO, Press release on March 6, 2008 and recited by Amnesty International, 
Press release on March 6, 2008. According two NGO’ reports, a North Korean official reportedly said that 13 
women and two men were shot dead in town of Onseong for a warning to people. 
152 David Hawk, supra pp.25 
153 Kim Yong-Sam & An Myong-Chol, Political Prisoners’ Camps in North Korea, Centre for the 
Advancement of North Korean Human Rights (1995), pp.29-45.  
154 Appendix C 
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It is a right for a person to determine where he/she chooses to live, to be able to relocate 
without interruption and not to be relocated against persons’ will.  The ICCPR in Article 12 
reaffirms and protects it as a fundamental right.155 
 
Nonetheless, the North Korean regime does not recognize these rights. It assigns housing to 
its citizens according to their social status and forcibly relocates citizens who are criminals, 
defectors and persons who have made political complaints with their family to secluded 
places in rural areas. People expelled to the rural area are isolated from the local citizens as 
they are subjected to surveillance.  Individuals who change residence without permission 
would face extreme restrictions in social activities including finding jobs and having access 
to food distribution.156 
 
Recently, the North Korean regime revised its Constitution and allowed its citizens the 
freedom of residence and travel due to the fact that its economy had collapsed, worsened 
food shortages and due to the international community’s criticism.157  However, significant 
constraints are still imposed. For instance, North Koreans need a ‘travel permit’ even for 
travelling domestically. It is strictly controlled and the number of travel permits is 
limited.158 
 
The North Korean regime harshly controls its citizen’s foreign travel as well.  The only 
country citizens are permitted to travel to is China. In order to get a ‘foreign travel permit’, 
it is required to pay a large amount of money as an application fee and wait for three to ten 
years to receive a permit.  It is given as a single permit and has to be re-apply for every 
time. It is difficult for ordinary citizens to get a ‘foreign travel permit’.159 
 
                                                 
155 White Paper on Human Rights in North Korea 2007, supra pp.170-171 
156 Ibid pp.171-175 
157 Constitution finder, supra art.75 
158 Ibid pp.176-177 
159 Ibid pp.178 
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4.3 Prosecution versus Persecution 
 
In order to be eligible for refugee status, a person must have a ‘well-founded fear of being 
persecuted’ based on at least one of the five conventional grounds under the 1951 Refugee 
Convention.  However, the 1951 Refugee Convention and its 1967 Protocol does not have 
a definition of persecution.  The UNHCR Handbook in paragraph 51 acknowledges that 
there is no universally accepted definition of persecution.160  It thus could be discerned 
from Article 33 of the 1951 Refugee Convention that infliction of physical and or mental 
harm, a threat to life or freedom, including threats of physical harm may constitute 
persecution.  
 
In Sangha v. INS, 161 the United States Court of Appeal for the 9th Circuit also held that the 
infliction of suffering or harm upon those who differ in any way, such as race, religion or 
political opinion, constitutes persecution can be regarded as offensive. The UNHCR 
Handbook further provides in Paragraph 53 that threats directed against an asylum 
applicant if taken cumulatively may amount to persecution.162 
 
                                                 
160 UNHCR Handbook in Para.51 states that “there is no universally accepted definition of “persecution”, and 
various attempts to formulate such a definition have met with little success. From Article 33 of the 1951 
Convention, it may be inferred that a threat to life or freedom on account of race, religion, nationality, 
political opinion or membership of a particular social group is always persecution. Other serious violations of 
human rights--for the same reasons--would also constitute persecution”. 
161 Sangha v INS 103 F 3d 1482 1487 (9th Cir. 1997), United States Court of Appeals for the 9th Circuit   See 
also Shoafera case, Nigizi Shoafera v INS Respondent, No. 98-70565 (9th Cir.2000). 
162 UNHCR Handbook in para.53 states that “an applicant may have been subjected to various measures not 
in themselves amounting to persecution (e.g. discrimination in different forms), in some cases combined with 
other adverse factors (e.g. general atmosphere of insecurity in the country of origin). In such situations, the 
various elements involved may, if taken together, produce an effect on the mind of the applicant that can 
reasonably justify a claim to well-founded fear of persecution on “cumulative grounds”. Needless to say, it is 
not possible to lay down a general rule as to what cumulative reasons can give rise to a valid claim to refugee 
status. This will necessarily depend on all the circumstances, including the particular geographical, historical 
and ethnological context”. 
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Article 117 of the North Korean criminal code provides as follows that:  
“One who crosses the border without permission shall be punished by a sentence of three 
years or less labour re-education”  
Article 47 mentions that:  
“One who escapes to another country or to the enemy in betrayal of his motherland and 
people, or who commits treacherous acts towards the motherland such as espionage or 
treason, shall be punished by at least seven years or more labour re-education. If it is a 
serious violation, he shall be punished by execution and forfeiture of all property”.163   
 
The criminal code is applies leniently to North Koreans who crossed into China in search 
of food. However, an indefinite term in a re-education camp that can lead to execution is 
imposed on persons who engaged in the following repeated crossings, contacting South 
Koreans or foreign missionaries or humanitarian aid workers, contacting journalists, 
marriage & pregnancy or other evidence of sexual liaison in China, prolonged residence in 
China, efforts to gain asylum in South Korea or other third countries, having committed a 
crime in North Korea before departure for China.164 The penalty also applies irrespective of 
their motives for leaving the country. 
As mentioned above, North Korean regime revised its criminal code and it has led to a 
reduction in the penalties and provides for pardons for those who left the county for non-
political or non religious reasons.165  Nevertheless, it does not function in practice. 
 
Article 6 of the ICCPR enshrines the fundamental right to life and no one should be 
arbitrarily deprived of his or her life. The North Korean regime can not derogate from its 
obligation to protect this inherent right to life even in a situation of emergency, but North 
Koreans are still struggling with severe human rights abuses, suffering famine, malnutrition, 
                                                 
163 The Invisible Exodus, supra pp.20-21 
164 Ibid pp.21-22 
165 See Muntarbhorn, UN Human Rights Committee, Concluding Observations and Recommendations of the 
Human Rights Committee: Democratic People’s Republic of Korea UN Doc CCPR/ CO/ 72/PRC (2001), 
para.4. 
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starvation and disease.  Depriving the right to life of people and continuously threatening to 
its enjoyment, could amount to persecution. 
The UN Human Rights Committee noted regarding North Korea’s situation: 
“Given the State party’s obligation, under Article 6 of the Covenant, to protect the life of its 
citizens and to take measures to reduce infant mortality and increase life expectancy, the 
Committee remains seriously concerned about the lack of measures by the State party to 
deal with the food and nutrition situation in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korean 
and the lack of measures to address, in cooperation with the international community, the 
causes and consequences of the drought and other disasters which seriously affected the 
country’s population in the 1990’s”.166 
 
4.4 ‘Well-founded Fear’ of Persecution 
 
It is significant to point out that the mere fact of persecution is not enough to warrant the 
granting of refugee status. For the asylum seeker to be eligible for refugee status under the 
present circumstances, he/she should carry the burden of proof on a preponderance of 
probability that he/she has a well founded fear of persecution on account of either one of 
the enumerated statutory grounds under the 1951 Refugee Convention. 
 
A well-founded fear of persecution requires a ‘subjectively genuine’ and ‘objectively 
reasonable’ fear of persecution. The subjective component requires that the asylum seeker 
has a genuine concern that he/she will be persecuted.  In the case of Aguilera-Cota v. 
INS,167  the United States Court of Appeal stated that it maybe satisfied by the asylum 
seeker’s testimony that he/she genuinely fears persecution. 
 
                                                 
166 Ibid para.12 
167 Aguilera-Cota v INS. United States Court of Appeal for the 9th Circuit, 914 F. 2d 1375.1381 (9th Cir, 
1990) 
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As discussed supra, the North Korean criminal code considers repatriated North Koreans as 
serious criminals and put them into the political labour camps.  A former labour camp 
guard said of the conditions of the camps: 
“Life in the political prison camp is worse than death”, “We can not imagine how harsh 
the living conditions are”, “there are so many miserable stories. People pick undigested 
beans out of the dung of oxen to eat. They compete to take the clothes off of dead bodies to 
wear. It is not a human world”.168  
 
The objective component requires that the asylum seeker establish a reasonable fear of 
persecution by credible, direct and specific evidence.  The authority for this proposition is 
found in the case of Alla K. Pitcherskaia v. INS.169 In this case the Applicant had been at 
the receiving end of relentless harassment which in itself amounts to persecution. On that 
basis alone she was thus found to subjectively and objectively have a well-grounded fear of 
future persecution. It was held in the United States Court of Appeals case of Rutilio Lopez-
Soto v. John Ashcroft170 that the existence of past persecution creates a rebuttal 
presumption of future persecution.  
 
The following special report on the situation of human rights in North Korea is very 
relevant in assessing ‘well-founded fear’.   The Special Rapporteur stated that:171 
-    Torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, public 
executions, extrajudicial and arbitrary detention, the absence of due process and the 
rule of law, imposition of the death penalty for political reasons, the existence of a 
large number of prison camps and the extensive use of forced labour are common in 
North Korea. 
                                                 
168 See The Invisible Exodus, supra pp.24-28. It is a testimony from former labour camp guard Mr. Lee K. 
169 Pitcherskaia v INS, No. 95-70887, The United States Court of Appeals of the 9th Circuit, 118 F 3rd. 641, 
June 24, 1997 
170 Rutilio Lopez-Soto Petitioner v John Ashcroft Attorney general Respondent, No. 03-1331, United States 
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- Sanctions have imposed on its citizens who have been repatriated from abroad. In 
instances, treating their departure as treason leading to punishments of internment, 
torture, inhuman or degrading treatment or the death penalty. 
- The fundamental rights are all-pervasive and severe restrictions such as the freedoms 
of thought, conscience, religion, opinion and expression, peaceful assembly and 
association and on access of every person who wished to move freely within the 
country and travel abroad. 
- There is a serious violation of women’s rights. For examples, the trafficking of 
women for prostitution or forced marriage, ethnically motivated forced abortions, 
including by labour-inducing injection or natural delivery, as well as infanticide of 
children of repatriated mothers in police detention centres and labour-training camps. 
 
The UN Human Rights Special Repporteur also strongly urged that the North Korea regime 
immediately put an end to the systemic, widespread and grave violations of human rights 
mentioned supra.172 
 
There is no doubt that North Koreans in China have already been subject to persecution or 
serious harm or to direct threats of such persecution or such harm. It is a convincing 
indication of North Korean’s well founded fear of persecution or real risk of suffering 
serious harm. 
 
4.5 The member of particular social group, religious and political opinions 
 
As asylum seeker to be eligible for protection as a refugee, he/she needs not only to 
establish the fact of persecution but that the persecution in question is on account of her/his 
membership to a statutorily protected group. This principle has been confirmed in a chain 
                                                 
172 Appendix C  
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of cases including the cases of In re Fauzia Kasinga supra and Benard Lukwago v. John 
Ashcroft173 among others.  
 
The 1951 Refugee Convention identifies five relevant grounds of persecution, all of which, 
in varying degrees, have been correspondingly developed in the field of non-
discrimination.174  Among the five relevant grounds, ‘member of particular social group, 
political opinions and religion’ could be applied to determine the status of North Koreans 
as refugees.175  
 
4.5.1 The membership of particular social group 
The United States Board of Immigration Appeals, in its 1985 opinion in the matter of 
Acosta176determined that a social group is defined by common characteristics that members 
of the group cannot change, and should not be required to change because such 
characteristics are identical to their individual identities.  Article 10 of the EU Directive on 
Minimum Standards for Protection as a refugee provide that a group shall be considered to 
form a particular social group where members of that group share an innate characteristic, 
or a common background that cannot be changed among others.177 
 
A member of a particular group could be considered as more vulnerable to harsh treatment 
after returning to North Korea because of his/her social classification. It was previously 
discussed that the North Korean regime divides its citizens into three classes and this class 
status is transferred from generation to generation. The citizens who belongs to ‘complex 
                                                 
173 Bernard Lukwago a/k/a Melvin Haft, Petitioner v. John Ashcroft, No. 02-1812, US Court of Appeals of 
the 3rd Circuit. 
174 Guy S. Goodwin-Gill and Jane McAdam, supra pp.70 
175 art.1.A (2) 
176 Roxana Pereda-Acosta, petitioner v. Immigration & Neutralization Service, Respondent, No.97-9508, U.S. 
Court of Appeals for the 10th Circuit. 
177 See art.10 para.1 (d) of the Council Directive 2004/83/EC of 29 April 2004 on minimum standards for the 
qualification and status of third country nationals or stateless persons as refugees or as persons who otherwise 
need international protection and the content of the protection granted. 
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class’ were assigned to dangerous or heavy-duty labour, blocked and suppressed from 
school admissions and party membership, classified as subject to surveillance and 
persecution and control by forcible relocation.  
 
The UNHCR recognizes that the membership of social group as a particular group who 
may be persecuted because there is no confidence in the group’s loyalty to the government 
or because the political outlook, antecedents or economic activity of their members, or the 
very existence of the social group as such, is held to be an obstacle to the Government’s 
policies.178 
 
4.5.2 Religious and political opinion 
Pursuant to Article 19 of the UDHR: 
“Everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and expression; the right includes freedom 
to hold opinions without interference and to seek, receive and impart information and ideas 
through any media and regardless of frontiers”.  
Article 67 of the North Korean Constitution describes political rights and Article 68 
mentions the freedom of religion. Nonetheless, these political and religious rights do not 
function in practice. There is no dissent or criticisms allowed toward the North Korean 
regime even the regime deprives its citizens of fundamental rights which are included in 
their constitutional law and are known as political, civil and religious rights. 
 
The North Korean regime oppresses people who oppose it through political concentration 
camp, collective responsibility and social discrimination.179  The regime has also 
persecuted and severely restricted religious freedom, including organized religious activity 
except those officially recognized and linked to government. Genuine religious freedom 
does not exist in North Korea.180 
 
                                                 
178 UNHCR Handbook para.78 
179 Appendix C 
180 U.S. Department of State, International Religious Freedom Report 2007-Nortk Korea 
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Therefore, persons who will be persecuted upon return to North Korea because of his/her 
religious and political opinion should be considered as membership to a statutorily 
protected group under the 1951 Refugee Convention. 
 
4.6 The possibility of acceptance as refugee under the 1951 Refugee Convention 
 
It is fully submitted that North Koreans in China qualify for refugee status under the 1951 
Refugee Convention because they will be persecuted after repatriation as discussed supra.  
 
It is no arguable that China as a contracting party has the right to decide whether to 
recognize North Koreans as refugees because the 1951 Refugee Convention does not 
mention this refugee identification procedure by itself. China insists that all North Koreans 
fail to qualify as refugees under the 1951 Refugee Convention because they primarily leave 
their country of origin to search food, not for fear of persecution. China has treated North 
Koreans as criminals and/or illegal migrants without any individual assessment, 
determining proper identification and/or applying appropriate procedures. 
 
China alleged that there is no obligation to protect North Koreans under international law.  
Nevertheless, all available sources mentioned above reported that North Koreans who are 
forcibly repatriated to their origin country have faced severely harsh treatment, such as 
torture, imprisonment and execution.  It has been fully proved supra that North Korean’s 
fear of persecution is more than well founded.181  
 
Indicated by Article 3 of the 1951 Refugee Convention, China has an obligation to apply 
the Convention to all refugees without discrimination as to race, religion or country of 
origins.  Under similar circumstances, China has received and extended effective protection 
                                                 
181 See Guy S. Goodwin-Gill and Jane McAdam, supra pp.58. It described that persons can certainly have a 
well-founded fear of an event happening when there is a less than 50% chance of the occurrence taking place. 
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to more than 280,000 Indo-Chinese refugees.182  There are also up to 300,000 people from 
Vietnam who came during the Vietnam civil war in 1979 and the Kachin Burmese has been 
allowed in as refugees. 
 
4.7 The possibility of protection as refugee sur-place 
 
North Koreans may receive the protection of the UNHCR under its mandate, given by the 
United Nations. It is an important factor that a person can not return to his/her country of 
origin because of persecution and it is not necessarily affected by the reasons of departure 
which were argued by China.183  It does not require that he/she could only become a 
refugee through an involuntary action by the 1951 Refugee Convention and its 1967 
Additional Protocol as well.184 
 
The UNHCR has to decide whether to extend refugee protection to North Koreans under a 
variety of situations. Though China maintains that North Koreans are not entitled to 
refugee protection, this is not binding on the UNHCR.185  China also agreed to cooperate 
with the UNHCR to facilitate its supervisory function under the bilateral agreement.  
                                                 
182 Mr. Guangya the vice Foreign Minister of the People’s Republic China stated it at the Ministerial Meeting 
of States parties to the 1951 Convention Relating to the status of Refugee on December 12, 2001. 
183 See UNHCR Hand book, para.94. It provides that “The requirement that a person must be outside his 
country to be a refugee does not mean that he must necessarily have left that country illegally, or even that he 
must have left it on account of well-founded fear. He may have decide to ask for recognition of his refuge 
status after having already been abroad for some time. A person who was not a refugee when he left his 
country, but who becomes a refugee at a later date, is called a refugee ’sur-place’” 
184 See UNHCR Hand book, para.96. It states that “A person may become a refugee ’sur place’ as a result of 
his own actions, such as associating with refugees already recognized, or expressing his political views in his 
country of residence. Whether such actions are sufficient to justify a well-founded fear of persecution must be 
determined by a careful examination of the circumstances. Regard should be had in particular to whether such 
actions may have come to the notice of the authorities of the person’s country of origin and how they are 
likely to be those authorities.” 
185 UNHCR Handbook, para.14, 15, 16.  
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However, the UNHCR fails to identify any North Korean as refugees even though the UN 
Special Rapporteur has defined all North Koreans who fled to China as refugees or refugee 
sur place, and human rights NGOs have urged that North Koreans in China have to be 
provided protection.186  For example, the 2002 Statistical Yearbook of the UNHCR, 
mentioned 304 North Korean refugees sought the help of the UNHCR and it assisted only 
one. This publication also counted 272 North Korean asylum applicants, and reported that 
UNHCR helped none.187 
 
4.8 Whether or not China should allow North Koreans to enter and provide 
protection  
 
As already discussed, China is a State party to the 1951 Refugee Convention and its 1967 
Protocol to accord certain standards of treatment to refugees, and to ensure to them certain 
rights. It is significant to point out that China needs to undertake to implement these 
standards of treatment in good faith. 
 
China has a legitimate interest in controlling illegal migration, and a right to do so through 
proper border measures.  However, it should not hinder the access both to refugee status 
determination procedures and to asylum from persecution. If China does this towards North 
Koreans, it is in breach of international obligations.  
 
Article 31 of the 1951 Refugee Convention provides that: 
“The contracting States shall not impose penalties, on account of their illegal entry or 
presence, on refugees who, coming directly from a territory where their life or freedom was 
                                                 
186 See Dr. Nadia Milanova, Lack of International Protection for North Korean Refugees, Human Rights 
Without Frontiers Int. (2005). She discourses that the newly appointed UN High Commissioner for Refugees, 
Mr. Antonio Guterres avoided to refer to North Korean defectors as refugees or asylum seekers during 56th 
annual EXCOM session 2005.  
187 Table 3&7 of UNHCR Statistical Yearbook 2002 
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threatened in their territory without authorization, provided they present themselves 
without delay to the authorities and show good cause for their illegal entry or presence”. 
It applies to North Koreans whether they have come directly from their home country, or 
from any other territory in which their lives or freedom were threatened, provided they 
show good cause for such entry or presence.  Article 31 thus includes threats to life or 
freedom as possible reasons for illegal entry or presence.188  Furthermore, having a well-
founded fear of persecution is generally recognized in itself as a sufficient good cause.189 
The meaning of ‘illegal entry or presence’ would include arriving through the use of false 
documents, the use of other deception, clandestine entry such as a stowaway, and entry into 
state territory with the assistance of smugglers or traffickers.190  The principle of immunity 
from penalties for refugees entering or presence without authorization is confirmed in the 
national legislation, case law, states practice, the 1951 Refugee Convention and even 
human rights instruments.191   
 
In the Amur v. France case,192 the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) expressly 
took Article 31 of the 1951 Refugee Convention and stated in its opinion that States have 
the undeniable sovereign right to control aliens’ entry into and residence in their territory. 
                                                 
188 See Guy S. Goodwin-Gill, Article 31 of the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees: Non-
penalization, Detention and Protection-A paper prepared at the request of the Department of International 
Protection for the UNHCR Global Consultation (October 2001) para.25.  
189 Guy S. Goodwin-Gill and Jane McAdam, supra pp.265 
190 Guy S. Goodwin-Gill, supra para.34 
191 See Guy S. Goodwin-Gill, supra para.36, 38, 39, 41, 52.  In instances, National legislation: United 
Kingdom, Immigration and Asylum Act 1999 Section 31 and Untied States, 8 Code of Federal Regulation 
part 270. Case law: Alimas Khaboka v. Secretary of State for the Home Department (1993) IMM AR 484, 
United Kingdom-the Court of Appeal, while finding for the secretary of State in regard to the appellant’s 
includes an asylum seeker whose application has not limitations laid down in article 31 of the 1951 Refugee 
Convention. State practice: Draft report by the Lawyers committee for Human Rights. Preliminary Review of 
States’ Procedures and Practices relating to Detention of Asylum Seekers, 20 September 2001 
192 European Court of Human Rights (ECHR), Ammur v France, No. 17/1995/523/609, 1996 
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Nonetheless, this right must be exercised in accordance with the provision of European 
Convention and must not deprive asylum seekers of the protection afforded by this. 
 
In its decision in A v. Australia193 in 1997, the Human Rights Committee describe that 
illegal entry may indicate a need for investigation and there may be other factors particular 
to the individual, such as the likelihood of absconding and lacking of cooperation, which 
may justify detention for a period. Without such factors detention may be considered 
arbitrary, even if entry was illegal. 
 
It is supported by the EXCOM, which insisted that asylum seekers should not be penalized 
to any unfavourable treatment solely on the ground of their presence which is considered 
unlawful in the receiving country.194      
The EXCOM also made another clear decision that: 
“intercepted asylum seekers should not become liable to criminal prosecution under the 
‘Protocol against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea and Air’ for the fact of having 
been the object of conduct set forth in article 6 of the Protocol; nor should any intercepted 
person incur any penalty for illegal entry or presence in a State in cases where the terms of 
Article 31 of the 1951 Convention are met”.195 
 
It is also essential that North Koreans be identified in order to provide them any proper 
protection.196  The UNHCR Handbook clearly states that refugees have to be identified in 
order to implement the provisions of the 1951 Refugee Convention and its 1967 Additional 
Protocol.197   In 1983, with regard to procedures, the EXCOM recommended that the 
asylum applicant should be given a complete personal interview by a fully qualified official 
when States determine refugee status or the grant of asylum. But China has categorized 
                                                 
193 A v Australia, Human Rights Committe, No.560/1993, 3 April 1997 
194 UNHCR EXCOM Conclusion No.22 (1981) 
195 Ibid No.97 (2003) 
196 UNHCR Handbook para.189 
197 UNHCR Handbook para.189 
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North Koreans as criminals and/or illegal migrant without using any individual 
identification procedures.    
 
  
It is repeatedly pointed out that the obligation China has towards North Koreans who are on 
its territory or who are subject to its jurisdiction is one of the consequences of sovereignty.  
Nonetheless, China continue to routinely detain and repatriate North Koreans on an 
arbitrary basis without giving them adequate access to the UNHCR and to fair procedures 
for timely reviewing of their detention status.  
 
China has to cooperate with the UNHCR and other humanitarian workers to resolve North 
Korean refugee issues in respect of the human rights of the individuals involved. North 
Koreans should not be penalised solely by reason of illegal entry.  If China continuously 
refuses to provide for the operation of the asylum process, including procedural guarantees 
of due process to North Koreans, it is a breach of the basic refugee protection under 
international law. 
 
The UNHCR Guidelines on the Detention of Asylum Seekers also affirmed Article 31 of 
the 1951 Refugee Convention as a general principle in regards to the treatment to be 
accorded to minors, other vulnerable groups, and women, and to the conditions of detention, 
which should be humane and with respect shown to the inherent dignity of the person.198 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
198 Appendix E, UNHCR Revised Guidelines on the Detention of Asylum-Seekers, February 1999, Guideline 
6-8.  See also Guys S. Goodwin-Gill, supra para.130 
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5 Conclusion (Search for reasonable solution) 
 
5.1 Recognize North Koreans as refugee and provide protection 
 
It has been fully discussed supra that many North Koreans could be recognized as refugee 
under the 1951 Refugee Convention and its 1967 Protocol.  But China has persistently 
claimed that North Koreans who cross the border illegally are economic migrants and thus 
not entitled to refugee protection.  As previously discussed, this claim does not have legal 
basis and is even contrary to international law.  China should uphold its international 
obligations through interpreting and applying international law reasonably in good faith 
and should stop categorizing the whole of North Koreans as criminals and/or illegal 
migrants.   
 
China also does not provide any protection against refoulement even though it has an 
obligation to do so as a State party to the 1951 Refugee Convention and Convention 
Against Torture. It was convincingly pointed out supra that North Koreans were arbitrarily 
imprisoned and tortured upon returning to their origin country.  China should provide 
protection to North Koreans on its territory and should not to repatriate them as it has 
received and extended effective protection to massive numbers of Indo-Chinese refugees. 
 
China has also an obligation to respect the ‘inviolability of diplomatic property’ under 
international law. China cannot legitimately slip into foreign premises to repatriate North 
Koreans and/or arrange for heavy security guards to prevent North Koreans from entry to 
foreign compounds to seek protection.  
 
5.2 Grant access to UNHCR 
 
It is obvious that the UNHCR has a significant role to play in protecting North Koreans. 
According to Article 3 paragraph 5 of the 1995 agreement between the UNHCR and China, 
the UNHCR personnel have ‘unimpeded access’ to North Koreans inside Chinese borders 
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to be able to determine their refugee status and/or their need for any assistance.  In order to 
carry out its mandate to protect North Koreans, the UNHCR should hire and/or call on 
experienced humanitarian workers to investigate and provide humanitarian assistance.  The 
UNHCR was also ensured ‘this unimpeded access to refugees’ through the resolution.199 
Another benefit for allowing unhindered access of the UNHCR to North Koreans in China 
is that it could reduce the number of North Koreans entering foreign missions and 
compounds to claim refugee status.  
 
Nevertheless, China has blocked the UNHCR access to North Korean asylum seekers 
consistently. China has an anxiety that ‘this unimpeded access’ will lead to a mass exodus 
from North Korea and cause a collapse of the North Korea regime. For instance, the 2004 
World Refugee Survey indicates that China has denied the UNHCR access to more than 
100,000 North Koreans.200 
 
If China has consistently denied the UNHCR access to North Koreans, it is essential that 
the UNHCR regional office in China should initiate arbitration proceeding to invoke its 
mandate towards North Koreans.  However, the UNHCR is not asserting those arbitration 
rights against the government of China even though it is UNHCR’s responsibility to protect 
North Korean refugees.  
 
 5.3 Protect women and children 
 
China has concrete and clear obligations to protect women and children against violence, 
whether committed by state agents or by non-state actors. If China does not prevent acts of 
violence against women, does not investigate such acts when they occur and prosecute and 
punish perpetrators, and provide relief to North Korean women and children, it is violation 
of numerous international human rights instruments which prohibit human trafficking in 
connection with sexual slavery or exploitation. 
                                                 
199 United Nations Security Council Resolution, S/RES/1019, 9 Nov. 1995 at operative para.2 
200 2004 World Refugee Survey, supra Table 10 
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 China should ensure the rights in Article 2 of International Convention on Civil and 
Political Rights are provided to all individuals within its territory and subject to its 
jurisdiction.  This general rule must be guaranteed without discrimination between Citizens 
and aliens.201 
Article 24 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights also recognizes the 
right of every child, without any discrimination, to receive his family, society and the State 
protection required by his status as a minor.  This Covenant requires that Children should 
be protected against discrimination on any grounds such as race, colour, sex, language, 
religion, national or social origin, property or birth.202 
 
It also has to be pointed out that China should grant National registry numbers (known as 
‘hou kou’ no.) as a way of providing humanitarian relief to North Korean women who have 
been trafficked into forced marriage and to North Korean Children who have lost their 
family and resort to vagrancy on the streets. It is discrimination and against international 
law that children who are born of North Korean and Chinese parents do not get any benefit 
from the government such as access to education and the medical system.  
 
5.4 Resettlement 
  
China has actively tried to block North Koreans from reaching the foreign embassies of 
potential resettlement countries such as the United States and South Korea, and refused to 
allow diplomatic missions to establish facilities to assess eligibility for resettlement.  
However, if China does not afford and/or is unwilling to provide refugee protection, it 
should assist North Koreans to reach potential resettlement countries to get any protection 
according to international law.  
 
                                                 
201 Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, General Comment No.15: The position of aliens 
under the Covenant, 11/04/86. 
202 Ibid No.17: Rights of the child (Art. 24), 07/04/89 
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It seems obvious that South Korea (Republic of Korea) is the most suitable country for the 
resettlement of North Koreans because they are entitled to get citizenship under Article 3 of 
the Constitution of South Korea203and provisions in the Protection of North Korean 
Residents and Support of their Settlement Act.204  In the past, South Korea has admitted 
approximately 3,800 North Korean refugees for domestic resettlement between 1994 and 
2003.205  Amnesty International reported in 2004 that over 5,000 North Koreans had 
successfully reached and been granted South Korean citizenship.  North Koreans who 
resettle in South Korea could receive subsidies such as public housing, job training, living 
expenses over two years and employment insurance.  
However, there is some discrimination that exists because of their lack of education, lack of 
occupational skills and their accent.206  Due to the South Korean government’s changing 
policy, budget limitations and growing reluctance to accept North Koreans, some North 
Koreans residing in South Korea would prefer to resettle in Western countries these days. 
 
United States is also suitable country for the resettlement. For example, North Korean 
Human Rights Act in Section 302 explicitly states that North Korean asylum seekers are 
not to be disadvantaged or disqualified from eligibility in United States because of their 
South Korean citizenship.207  Section 303 of the Act describes North Korean refugees as a 
‘Priority 2’ group, thus enabling to them to make a direct application without UNHCR’s 
referral.   
Nonetheless, it does not function effectively because many North Koreans are unable to 
access this program.  In practice, United States consular officials can not get in contact with 
North Korean refugees in China.  It seems that, in order to make this program work, China 
                                                 
203 It states that the territory of South Korea is defined as the whole Korean peninsula and its contiguous 
islands. Based on this, North Koreans are entitled to get the protection from South Korean government in 
theoretically. But, it applies differently in practice. 
204 It stipulates the procedure for invoking protection. See South Korean law number 6474, Partial revision on 
May 24, 2001. 
205 North Korean Human Rights Act, H.R. 4011 section3 para.23 (2004). 
206 The Invisible Exodus, supra pp.31-32 
207 Ibid section 302(a) 
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has to co-operate with the United States consular officers to access to North Korean 
refugees for initial interviewing and/or to give them permission to exile to a third country.  
In addition, North Koreans with humanitarian workers’ assistance could manage to reach 
the third countries such as Thailand and Cambodia. United States consular staffs in 
Southeast Asian countries should be on the lookout for North Korean refugees and be ready 
to assist them for resettlement.   
 
5.5 International burden sharing 
 
As discussed supra, the North Korean refugee crisis merits significant international 
attention because they have been the most vulnerable group and silent victims in our 
international community during the last few decades.  Their government does not have the 
ability to protect its citizens.  There is also limited ability to seek a durable solution 
between neighbouring countries such as China, Russia and Mongolia because their reaction 
is still unfavourable for protecting North Korean refugees even though much of the 
criticism has been aimed at them. 
 
However, without neighbouring countries’ assistance, it is hard to provide the protection 
required. The international community should share the burden of responsibility and play a 
role in protecting North Koreans. It is essential for international community to work with 
those neighbouring countries through negotiation and/or give them intensive assistance as 
needed.  As a minimum, North Koreans need to get at least temporary protection from 
those neighbouring countries.   
On the other hand, the international community has to impose on China the obligation to 
co-operate with the UNHCR regional office and other humanitarian organizations.  It 
would be of considerable help if international lawyers were to assist China to adapt asylum 
law and implement provisions at the nation level.   
 
Additional support for the North Korean refugees can include advocacy at the international 
level, and more effective protection by establishing refugee camps and/or facilities in the 
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North-East part of China or Mongolia. The later idea will require more financial assistance 
as well as political support from our international community.   
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APPENDIX B: LETTER FROM CHINESE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS TO 
FOREIGN EMBASSIES, MAY 31, 2002208 
 
(Informal translation) 
(2002) LINGSIZI NO. 694 
To all foreign embassies in China: 
The Consular Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of 
China presents its compliments to all foreign embassies in China and has the honour to 
inform the following: 
Recently the events occurred in succession that the third country nationals intruded into 
foreign embassies and consulates in China. This directly endangered the security of the 
embassies and consulates concerned and disturbed their routine work. It also provoked 
Chinese law and affected the public security and stability of China. Upon the request of 
many foreign embassies and consulates in China, the Chinese side has taken a series of 
measures to protect the security of foreign diplomatic and consular representing 
institutions. These security measures are in conformity with the interests of both sides. In 
the future the Chinese side will make great efforts as always to provide safe working and 
living environment for foreign embassies and consulates, and conscientiously undertake 
due obligations as receiving country in accordance with "Vienna Convention of Diplomatic 
Relations" and "Vienna Convention of Consular Relations" . According to the principle of 
international law that embassies and consulates has no right of asylum, the Chinese side 
also wishes embassies concerned to render cooperation and inform the Consular 
Department of Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs in case the illegal intruders were found, 
and hand over the intruders to the Chinese public security organs. 
The above-mentioned principle is also applicable in dealing with the intruders into foreign 
consulate institutions. 
                                                                                                             May 31, 2002, Beijing 
 
 
 
                                                 
208 The source of this letter from Human Rights Watch: Invisible Exodus, supra pp.35 
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APPENDIX C: SITUATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE 
DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF KOREA – Human Rights 
Resolution 2005/1 
(OFFICE OF THE HIGH COMMISSION FOR HUMAN RIGHTS) 
  
            The Commission on Human Rights, 
 Guided by the Charter of the United Nations, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the 
International Covenants on Human Rights and other human rights instruments, 
 Reaffirming that all States Members of the United Nations have the obligation to promote and 
protect human rights and fundamental freedoms and to implement the obligations they have assumed under 
international instruments, 
 Recalling its resolutions 2003/10 of 16 April 2003 and 2004/13 of 15 April 2004, 
Mindful that the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea is a party to the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights, the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, the Convention 
on the Rights of the Child and the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against 
Women, 
 Noting the submission by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea of its second periodic report 
concerning the implementation of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
(E/1990/6/Add.35) and its second periodic report on the implementation of the Convention on the Rights of 
the Child (CRC/C/65/Add.24) as a sign of more active engagement in international cooperative efforts in the 
field of human rights, and encouraging the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea to continue to submit its 
reports in a timely manner, 
Taking note of the concluding observations of the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights on the reports submitted by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, including suggested 
measures to guarantee the right to be free from hunger, 
Welcoming the invitation by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea to members of the 
Committee on the Rights of the Child and to the Special Rapporteur on violence against women, it causes 
and consequences, to visit the country, 
Welcoming also the fact that the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea has held consultations with 
some countries on human rights issues, 
Underlining the importance of the effective continuation of the process of rapprochement between 
the two Koreas and noting progress in this respect, 
Welcoming the report of the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in the Democratic 
People’s Republic of Korea (E/CN.4/2005/34), 
Desiring to promote an open and constructive approach leading to concrete progress in the field of 
human rights, 
 1. Expresses its deep concern about continuing reports of systemic, widespread and grave 
violations of human rights in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, including: 
 (a) Torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, public 
executions, extrajudicial and arbitrary detention, the absence of due process and the rule of law, imposition 
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of the death penalty for political reasons, the existence of a large number of prison camps and the extensive 
use of forced labour; 
 (b) Sanctions on citizens of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea who have been 
repatriated from abroad, such as treating their departure as treason leading to punishments of internment, 
torture, inhuman or degrading treatment or the death penalty; 
 (c) All-pervasive and severe restrictions on the freedoms of thought, conscience, religion, 
opinion and expression, peaceful assembly and association and on access of everyone to information, and 
limitations imposed on every person who wishes to move freely within the country and travel abroad; 
(d) Continued violation of the human rights and fundamental freedoms of women, in particular 
the trafficking of women for prostitution or forced marriage, ethnically motivated forced abortions, including 
by labour-inducing injection or natural delivery, as well as infanticide of children of repatriated mothers, 
including in police detention centres and labour-training camps; 
2. Expresses its grave concern that the Government of the Democratic People’s Republic of 
Korea has not accepted the mandate of the Special Rapporteur, as contained in Commission resolution 
2004/13 of 15 April 2004, and has not extended any cooperation to the Special Rapporteur; 
3. Also expresses its concern that the Government of the Democratic People’s Republic of 
Korea has not engaged in technical cooperation activities with the United Nations High Commissioner for 
Human Rights and her Office, despite efforts by the High Commissioner to engage in a dialogue with the 
authorities of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea in this regard; 
4. Further expresses its deep concern at the precarious humanitarian situation in the country, 
in particular the prevalence of infant malnutrition which, despite recent progress, still affects the physical 
and mental development of a significant percentage of children; 
 5. Strongly urges the Government of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea to address 
these concerns in an open and constructive manner, including: 
 (a) By immediately putting an end to the systemic, widespread and grave violations of human 
rights mentioned above; 
(b) By providing all pertinent information concerning the above-mentioned issues to, and 
removing restrictions on access to the country by, the international community; 
 (c) By accepting the mandate of the Special Rapporteur, extending its full and unreserved 
cooperation and assistance to the Special Rapporteur in the discharge of his mandate and, to this end, 
taking all necessary steps to ensure that the Special Rapporteur has free and unlimited access to any person 
in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea whom he might wish to meet; 
 (d) By ratifying human rights instruments to which the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea 
is not yet a party, in particular the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading 
Treatment or Punishment and the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial 
Discrimination, and by implementing its obligations under the human rights instruments to which the 
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea is a party, ensuring that all necessary measures are undertaken to 
this end; 
 (e) By adhering to internationally recognized labour standards and considering as a matter of 
priority joining the International Labour Organization and becoming a party to the International Labour 
Organization Convention concerning Forced or Compulsory Labour, 1930 (No. 29) and the Convention 
concerning the Prohibition and Immediate Action for the Elimination of the Worst Forms of Child Labour, 
1999 (No. 182); 
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 (f) By implementing the recommendations of the Committee on the Rights of the Child, the 
Human Rights Committee and the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights; 
 (g) By cooperating with the United Nations system in the field of human rights 
and cooperating without restriction with the thematic procedures of the Commission on Human Rights 
relevant to the situation of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, in particular with the Special 
Rapporteur on the right to food, the Special Rapporteur on torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading 
treatment or punishment, the Special Rapporteur on freedom 
of religion or belief, the Special Rapporteur on the right to freedom of opinion and expression, the Special 
Rapporteur on violence against women, its causes and consequences, the Working Group on Arbitrary 
Detention and the Working Group on Enforced or Involuntary Disappearances, as well as with international 
human rights organizations, including human rights defenders; 
(h) By developing a constructive dialogue with the United Nations High Commissioner for 
Human Rights and her Office with a view to establishing technical cooperation programmes in the field of 
human rights, as well as consultations on human rights with other countries; 
(i) By ensuring that humanitarian organizations, including non-governmental organizations 
and United Nations agencies, in particular the World Food Programme, have full, free, safe and unimpeded 
access to all parts of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea in order for them to ensure that 
humanitarian assistance is delivered impartially on the basis of need, in accordance with humanitarian 
principles; 
(j) By upholding international human rights standards together with democratic pluralism and 
the rule of law, with greater space for civil society participation at all levels of decision-making and 
implementation, and establishing a national human rights commission or equivalent; 
 (k) By resolving, clearly and transparently and urgently, all the unresolved questions relating 
to the abduction of foreigners in the form of an enforced disappearance, which remains a grave violation of 
human rights, including by ensuring the immediate return of abductees; 
 (l) By cooperating with its neighbouring Governments to bring an end to the trafficking of 
women; 
 6. Requests the international community: 
(a) To urge the Government of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea to extend full and 
unreserved cooperation to the Special Rapporteur; 
(b) To continue to urge the Government of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea to 
ensure that humanitarian assistance, especially food aid, destined for the people of the Democratic People’s 
Republic of Korea is distributed in accordance with humanitarian principles and that representatives of 
international humanitarian actors are allowed to travel throughout the country to monitor this distribution; 
(c) To urge States to ensure respect for the fundamental principles of asylum; 
 7. Requests the Special Rapporteur to continue his efforts to establish direct contact with the 
Government and with the people of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, to report on the situation of 
human rights in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and on the Government’s compliance with its 
obligations under international human rights instruments, including through visits to the country and 
information received from all relevant actors, such as Governments, non-governmental organizations and 
any other parties who have knowledge of these matters; 
8. Requests all relevant special rapporteurs and special representatives to examine alleged 
human rights violations in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and to report thereon to the 
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Commission at its sixty-second session, and requests the Secretary-General to give all necessary assistance 
to enable the special rapporteurs and special representatives to discharge their mandates fully, including 
through visits to the country; 
9. Requests the High Commissioner to continue her efforts to engage in a comprehensive 
dialogue with the authorities of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea with a view to establishing 
technical cooperation programmes in the field of human rights and to submit her findings and 
recommendations to the Commission at its sixty-second session; 
10. Decides to extend the mandate of the Special Rapporteur, as contained in Commission 
resolution 2004/13 of 15 April 2004, for a further year; 
11. Requests the Secretary-General to give the Special Rapporteur all necessary assistance in 
the discharge of his mandate; 
12. Requests the Special Rapporteur to report his findings and recommendations to the 
General Assembly at its sixtieth session and to the Commission at its sixty-second session; 
13. Urges other United Nations bodies, in particular the General Assembly, to take up the 
question of the situation of human rights in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea if the Government 
does not extend cooperation to the Special Rapporteur and if improvement of the situation of human rights 
in the country is not observed; 
14. Decides to continue its consideration of this question at its sixty-second session under the 
same agenda item, as a matter of high priority; 
 15. Recommends the following draft decision to the Economic and Social Council for adoption: 
 “The Economic and Social Council, taking note of Commission on Human Rights resolution 
2005/11 of 14 April 2005, endorses the Commission’s decision to extend the mandate of the 
Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, 
as contained in Commission resolution 2004/13 of 15 April 2004, for a further year. The Council 
further approves the request to the Special Rapporteur to report his findings and recommendations 
to the General Assembly at its sixtieth session and to the Commission on Human Rights at its sixty-
second session and the request to the Secretary-General to give the Special Rapporteur all 
necessary assistance in the discharge of his mandate.” 
50th meeting 
14 April 2005 
[Adopted by a recorded vote of 13 to 9, 
with 14 abstentions.  See chap. IX, E/CN.4/2005/L.10/Add.9] 
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APPENDIX D: China Raises Bounty on NK Refugees 1600% 
From: lfnkr-update@profollow.com on behalf of LFNKR - the NK Refugee Japanese NGO  
Sent:  April 9, 2008 12:47:08 PM 
To:  Chang Sig Park (legal_specialist@hotmail.com) 
  
Kato Hiroshi here, with a shocking new development just beginning to leak out of China.  
The government there has just raised the stakes in the human rights issue now coming to a boil.  
While the world's attention is focused on the uproar in Tibet, other developments are quietly taking place.  
China claims Tibetan protestors are being agitated by foreign religious elements, and so now is starting to suspect foreign 
connections behind any activities of which it disapproves.  Government officials have reportedly ordered the Department 
of Religion in each province to start thorough investigations into any involvement with foreign influences. 
  
LFNKR has received a report from our local staff in Jilin Province that any Christian church in Yanbien found to be 
involved with foreigners, including South Koreans, are being forced to shut down.  
 In addition, the punishment has been made more severe for extending help to North Korean defectors.  Until recently, 
violators were fined, but now they face imprisonment.  This has further discouraged our local staff and others who had 
been helping protect North Korean defectors.  
  
And there is more - The Yanbien Autonomous Korean Prefecture in Jilin Province recently issued oral instructions to the 
Dept. of Security, Dept. of Public Safety, and Dept. of Religion on attracting more informants to report NK defectors.  
According to people familiar with the Dept. of Religion in the Yanbien Autonomous Korean Prefecture, "The bounty has 
been raised from 500 RMB to at least 8000 RMB for one NK defector."  This amount is equivalent to the average annual 
income in China.  
  
China is encouraging people to hunt down North Korean refugees by increasing the bounty 1600 percent. This inhumane 
behavior should not be tolerated.  The North Korean refugees in China should be protected as refugees under the 
international refugees convention. 
  
LFNKR suggests that you send a letter urging the Chinese government to listen to the voice of the world and demonstrate 
to international society that they respect human rights by halting this inhumane behavior.  
 You can find the PRC embassy in your country by clicking here. 
http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/wjb/zwjg/2490/default.htm 
  
Regards from Japan, Kato Hiroshi Executive Director 
 Regards from Japan, 
Kato Hiroshi 
Secretary General 
A-101 Nishi Kata Hyteru, 2-2-8 Nishi Kata, Bunkyo-ku, Tokyo, Japan 113-0024 
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 OFFICE OF THE UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR 
REFUGEES, GENEVA 
 
February 1999 
UNHCR Revised Guidelines Applicable Criteria and Standards relating to the 
Detention of Asylum Seekers 
 
Introduction 
 
1. The detention of asylum seekers is, in the view of UNHCR inherently undesirable. 
This is even more so in the case of vulnerable groups such as single women, children, unaccompanied minors and those 
with special medical or psychological needs. Freedom from arbitrary detention is a fundamental human right and the use 
of detention is, in many instances, contrary to the norms and principles of international law. 
 
2. Of key significance to the issue of detention is Article 31 of the 1951 Convention. 
Article 31 exempts refugees coming directly from a country of persecution from being punished on account of their illegal 
entry or presence, provided they present themselves without delay to the authorities and show good cause for their illegal 
entry or presence. 
The Article also provides that Contracting States shall not apply to the movements of such refugees restrictions other than 
those which are necessary, and that any restrictions shall only be applied until such time as their status is regularised, or 
they obtain admission into another country. 
 
3. Consistent with this Article, detention should only be resorted to in cases of necessity. 
The detention of asylum seekers who come ‘directly’ in an irregular manner should, therefore, not be automatic, or 
unduly prolonged. This provision applies not only to recognised refugees but also to asylum seekers pending 
determination of their status, as recognition of refugee status does not make an individual a refugee but declares him to be 
one.  
Conclusion No 44 (XXXVII) of the Executive Committee on the Detention of 
Refugees and Asylum seekers examines more concretely what is meant by the term ‘necessary’. This Conclusion also 
provides guidelines to States on the use of detention and recommendations as to certain procedural guarantees to which 
detainees should be entitled. 
 
4. The expression ‘coming directly’ in Article 31(1), covers the situation of a person who enters the country in which 
asylum is sought directly from the country of origin, or from another country where his protection, safety and security 
could not be assured. It is understood that this term also covers a person who transits an intermediate country for a short 
period of time without having applied for, or received, asylum there. No strict time limit can be applied to the concept 
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‘coming directly’ and each case must be judged on its merits. Similarly, given the special situation of asylum seekers, in 
particular the effects of trauma, language problems, lack of information, previous experiences which often result in a 
suspicion of those in authority, feelings of insecurity, and the fact that these and other circumstances may vary 
enormously from one asylum seeker to another, there is no time limit which can be mechanically applied or associated 
with the expression ‘without delay’.  The expression ‘good cause’, requires a consideration of the circumstances under 
which the asylum seeker fled. The term ‘asylum seeker’ in these guidelines applies to those whose claims are being 
considered under an admissibility or pre-screening procedure as well as those who are being considered under refugee 
status determination procedures. It also includes those exercising their right to seek judicial and/or administrative review 
of their asylum request. 
 
5. Asylum seekers are entitled to benefit from the protection afforded by various International and Regional Human 
Rights instruments which set out the basic standards and norms of treatment. Whereas each State has a right to control 
those entering into their territory, these rights must be exercised in accordance with a prescribed law which is accessible 
and formulated with sufficient precision for the regulation of individual conduct. For detention of asylum seekers to be 
lawful and not arbitrary, it must comply riot only with the applicable national law, but with Article 31 of the Convention 
and international law. It must be exercised in a non-discriminatory manner and must be subject to judicial or 
administrative review to ensure that it continues to be necessary in the circumstances, with the possibility of release where 
no grounds for its continuation exist. 
 
6. Although these guidelines deal specifically with the detention of asylum seekers the issue of the detention of stateless 
persons needs to be highlighted. While the majority of stateless persons are not asylum seekers, a paragraph on the 
detention of stateless persons is included in these guidelines in recognition of UNHCR’s formal responsibilities for this 
group and also because the basic standards and norms of treatment contained in international human rights instruments 
applicable to detainees generally should be applied to both asylum seekers and stateless persons. The inability of stateless 
persons who have left their countries of habitual residence to return to them, has been a reason for unduly prolonged or 
arbitrary detention of these persons in third countries. Similarly, individuals whom the State of nationality refuses to 
accept back on the basis that nationality was withdrawn or lost while they were out of the country, or who are not 
acknowledged as nationals without proof of nationality, which in the circumstances is difficult to acquire, have also been 
held in prolonged or indefinite detention only because the question of where to send them remains unresolved. 
 
Guideline 1: Scope of the Guidelines 
These guidelines apply to all asylum seekers who are being considered for or who are in, detention or detention-like 
situations. For the purpose of these guidelines, UNHCR considers detention as: confinement within a narrowly bounded 
or restricted location, including prisons, closed camps, detention facilities or airport transit zones, where freedom of 
movement is substantially curtailed, and where the only opportunity to leave this limited area is to leave the territory. 
There is a qualitative difference between detention and other restrictions on freedom of movement. Persons who are 
subject to limitations on domicile and residency are not generally considered to be in detention. When considering 
whether an asylum seeker is in detention, the cumulative impact of the restrictions as well as the degree and intensity of 
each of them should also be assessed. 
 
 I
Guideline 2: General Principle 
As a general principle asylum seekers should not be detained. 
According to Article 14 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the right to seek and enjoy asylum is recognised 
as a basic human right. In exercising this right asylum seekers are often forced to arrive at, or enter, a territory illegally. 
However the position of asylum seekers differs fundamentally from that of ordinary immigrants in that they may not be in 
a position to comply with the legal formalities for entry. This element, as well as the fact that asylum seekers have often 
had traumatic experiences, should be taken into account in determining any restrictions on freedom of movement based 
on illegal entry or presence. 
 
Guideline 3: Exceptional Grounds for Detention 
Detention of asylum seekers may exceptionally be resorted to for the reasons set out below as long as this is clearly 
prescribed by a national law which is in conformity with general norms and principles of international human rights law. 
These are contained in the main human rights instruments. There should be a presumption against detention. Where there 
are monitoring mechanisms which can be employed as viable alternatives to detention, (such as reporting obligations or 
guarantor requirements [see Guideline 4)) , these should be applied first unless there is evidence to suggest that such an 
alternative will not be effective in the individual case. Detention should therefore only take place after a full consideration 
of all possible alternatives, or when monitoring mechanisms have been demonstrated not to have achieved the lawful and 
legitimate purpose. 
In assessing whether detention of asylum seekers is necessary, account should be taken of whether it is reasonable to do 
so and whether it is proportional to the objectives to be achieved. If judged necessary it should only be imposed in a non 
discriminatory manner for a minimal period. 
The permissible exceptions to the general rule that detention should normally be avoided must be prescribed by law. In 
conformity with EXCOM Conclusion No 44 (XXXVII) the detention of asylum seekers may only be resorted to, if 
necessary: 
 
(i) to verify identity 
This relates to those cases where identity may be undetermined or in dispute. 
(ii) to determine the elements on which the claim for refugee status or asylum is based 
This statement means that the asylum seeker may be detained exclusively for the purposes of a preliminary interview to 
identify the basis of the asylum claim. This would involve obtaining essential facts from the asylum seeker as to why 
asylum is being sought and would not extend to a determination of the merits or otherwise of the claim. This exception to 
the general principle cannot be used to justify detention for the entire status determination procedure, or for an unlimited 
period of time. 
(iii) in cases where asylum seekers have destroyed their travel and /or identity documents or have used fraudulent 
documents in order to mislead the authorities of the State, in which they intend to claim asylum 
What must be established is the absence of good faith on the part of the applicant to comply with the verification of 
identity process. As regards asylum seekers using fraudulent documents or travelling with no documents at all, detention 
is only permissible when there is an intention to mislead, or a refusal to co-operate with the authorities. Asylum seekers 
who arrive without documentation because they are unable to obtain any in their country of origin should not be detained 
solely for that reason. 
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(iv) to protect national security and public order 
This relates to cases where there is evidence to show that the asylum seeker has criminal antecedents and/or affiliations 
which are likely to pose a risk to public order or national security should he/she be allowed entry. Detention of asylum 
seekers which is applied for purposes other than those listed above, for example, as part of a policy to deter future asylum 
seekers, or to dissuade those who have commenced their claims from pursuing them, is contrary to the norms of refugee 
law. It should not be used as a punitive or disciplinary measure for illegal entry or presence in the country. Detention 
should also be avoided for failure to comply with the administrative requirements or other institutional restrictions related 
residency at reception centres, or refugee camps. Escape from detention should not lead to the automatic discontinuation 
of the asylum procedure, or to return to the country of origin, having regard to the principle of non-refoulement. 
 
Guideline 4: Alternatives to Detention 
Alternatives to the detention of an asylum seeker until status is determined should be considered. The choice of an 
alternative would be influenced by an individual assessment of the personal circumstances of the asylum seeker 
concerned and prevailing local conditions. 
Alternatives to detention which may be considered are as follows: 
 
(i) Monitoring Requirements 
Reporting Requirements: Whether an asylum seeker stays out of detention may be conditional on compliance with 
periodic reporting requirements during the status determination procedures. Release could be on the asylum seeker’s own 
recognisance, and/or that of a family member, NGO or community group who would be expected to ensure the asylum 
seeker reports to the authorities periodically, complies with status determination procedures, and appears at hearings and 
official appointments. 
Residency Requirements: Asylum seekers would not be detained on condition they reside at a specific address or within a 
particular administrative region until their status has been determined. Asylum seekers would have to obtain prior 
approval to change their address or move out of the administrative region. However this would not be unreasonably 
withheld where the main purpose of the relocation was to facilitate family reunification or closeness to relatives. 
 (ii) Provision of a Guarantor/Surety 
Asylum seekers would be required to provide a guarantor who would be responsible for ensuring their attendance at 
official appointments and hearings, failure of which a penalty most likely the forfeiture of a sum of money, levied against 
the guarantor. 
(iii) Release on Bail 
This alternative allows for asylum seekers already in detention to apply for release on bail, subject to the provision of 
recognisance and surety. For this to be genuinely available to asylum seekers they must be informed of its availability and 
the amount set must not be so high as to be prohibitive. 
(iv) Open Centres 
Asylum seekers may be released on condition that they reside at specific collective accommodation centres where they 
would be allowed permission to leave and return during stipulated times. These alternatives are not exhaustive. They 
identify options which provide State authorities with a degree of control over the whereabouts of asylum seekers while 
allowing asylum seekers basic freedom of movement. 
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Guideline 5: Procedural Safeguards 
If detained, asylum seekers should be entitled to the following minimum procedural guarantees: 
 
(i) to receive prompt and full communication of any order of detention, together with the reasons for the order and their 
rights in connection with the order, in a language and in terms which they understand; 
(ii) to be informed of the right to legal counsel. Where possible, they should receive free legal assistance; 
(iii) to have the decision subjected to an automatic review before a judicial or administrative body independent of the 
detaining authorities. This should be followed by regular periodic reviews of the necessity for the continuation of 
detention, which the asylum seeker or his representative would have the right to attend; 
(iv) either personally or through a representative, to challenge the necessity of the deprivation of liberty at the review 
hearing, ,and to rebut any findings made. Such a right should extend to all aspects of the case and not simply the 
executive discretion to detain; 
(v) to contact and be contacted by the local UNHCR Office, available national refugee bodies or other agencies and an 
advocate. The right to communicate with these representatives in private, and the means to make such contact should be 
made available. Detention should not constitute an obstacle to an asylum seekers’ possibilities to pursue their asylum 
application. 
 
Guideline 6: Detention of Persons under the Age of 18 years 
In accordance with the general principle stated at Guideline 2 and the UNHCR Guidelines on Refugee Children, minors 
who are asylum seekers should not be detained. 
In this respect particular reference is made to the Convention on the Rights of the Child in particular: 
 
• Article 2 which requires that States take all measures appropriate to ensure that children are protected from all forms of 
discrimination or punishment on the basis of the status, activities, expressed opinions, or beliefs of the child’s parents, 
legal guardians or family members; 
• Article 3 which provides that in any action taken by States Parties concerning children, the best interests of the child 
shall be a primary consideration; 
• Article 9 which grants children the right not to be separated from their parents against their will; 
• Article 22 which requires that States Parties take appropriate measures to ensure that minors who are seeking refugee 
status or who are recognised refugees, whether accompanied or not, receive appropriate protection and assistance; 
• Article 37 by which States Parties are required to ensure that the detention of minors be used only as a measure of last 
resort and for the shortest appropriate period of time; 
 
Unaccompanied minors should not, as a general rule, be detained. Where possible they should be released into the care of 
family members who already have residency within the asylum country. Where this is not possible, alternative care 
arrangements should be made by the competent child care authorities for unaccompanied minors to receive adequate 
accommodation and appropriate supervision. Residential homes or foster care placements may provide the necessary 
facilities to ensure their proper development, (both physical and mental), is catered for while longer term solutions are 
being considered. 
 
 L
All appropriate alternatives to detention should be considered in the case of children accompanying their parents. 
Children and their primary caregivers should not be detained unless this is the only means of maintaining family unity. If 
none of the alternatives can be applied and States do detain children, this should, in accordance with Article 37 of the 
Convention on the Rights of the Child, be as a measure of last resort, and for the shortest period of time. If children who 
are asylum seekers are detained at airports, immigration-holding centres or prisons, they must not be held under prison- 
like conditions. All efforts must be made to have them released from detention and placed in other accommodation. If this 
proves impossible, special arrangements must be made for living quarters which are suitable for children and their 
families. 
 
During detention, children have a right to education which should optimally take place outside the detention premises in 
order to facilitate the continuation of their education upon release. Provision should be made for their recreation and play 
which is essential to a child’s mental development and will alleviate stress and trauma. Children who are detained, benefit 
from the same minimum procedural guarantees (listed at Guideline 5) as adults. A legal guardian or adviser should be 
appointed for unaccompanied minors. 
 
Guideline 7: Detention of Vulnerable Persons 
Given the very negative effects of detention on the psychological well being of those detained, active consideration of 
possible alternatives should precede any order to detain asylum seekers falling within the following vulnerable categories: 
Unaccompanied elderly persons 
Torture or trauma victims 
Persons with a mental or physical disability 
 
In the event that individuals failing within these categories are detained, it is advisable that this should only be on the 
certification of a qualified medical practitioner that detention will not adversely affect their health and well being. In 
addition there must be regular follow up and support by a relevant skilled professional. They must also have access to 
services, hospitalisation, medication, counselling etc., should it become necessary. 
 
Guideline 8: Detention of Women 
Women asylum seekers and adolescent girls, especially those who arrive unaccompanied, are particularly at risk when 
compelled to remain in detention centres. As a general rule the detention of pregnant women in their final months and 
nursing mothers, both of whom may have special needs, should be avoided. Where women asylum seekers are detained 
they should be accommodated separately from male asylum seekers, unless these are close family relatives. In order to 
respect cultural values and improve the physical protection of women in detention centres, the use of female staff is 
recommended. 
 
Women asylum seekers should be granted access to legal and other services without discrimination as to their gender,72 
and specific services in response to their special needs. In particular they should have access to gynaecological and 
obstetrical services. 
 
Guideline 9: Detention of Stateless Persons 
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Everyone has the right to a nationality and the right not to be arbitrarily deprived of their nationality. 
Stateless persons, those who are not considered to be nationals by any State under the operation of its law, are entitled to 
benefit from the same standards of treatment as those in detention generally. Being stateless and therefore not having a 
country to which automatic claim might be made for the issue of a travel document should not lead to indefinite detention. 
Statelessness cannot be a bar to release. The detaining authorities should make every effort to resolve such cases in a 
timely manner, including through practical steps to identify and confirm the individual’s nationality status in order to 
determine which State they may be returned to, or through negotiations with the country of habitual residence to arrange 
for their re-admission. 
In the event of serious difficulties in this regard, UNHCR’s technical and advisory service pursuant to its mandated 
responsibilities for stateless persons may, as appropriate, be sought. 
 
Guideline 10: Conditions of Detention 
Conditions of detention for asylum seekers should be humane with respect shown for the inherent dignity of the person. 
They should be prescribed by law. 
Reference is made to the applicable norms and principles of international law and standards on the treatment of such 
persons. Of particular relevance are the 1988 UN Body of Principles for the Protection of all Persons under any form of 
Detention or Imprisonment, 1955 UN Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners, and the 1990 UN Rules 
for the Protection of Juveniles Deprived of their Liberty. 
 
The following points in particular should be emphasised: 
(i) the initial screening of all asylum seekers at the outset of detention to identify trauma or torture victims, for treatment 
in accordance with Guideline 7. 
(ii) the segregation within facilities of men and women; children from adults (unless these are relatives); 
(iii) the use of separate detention facilities to accommodate asylum seekers. The use of prisons should be avoided. If 
separate detention facilities are not used, asylum seekers should be accommodated separately from convicted criminals or 
prisoners on remand. There should be no commingling of the two groups; 
(iv) the opportunity to make regular contact and receive visits from friends, relatives, religious, social and legal counsel. 
Facilities should be made available to enable such visits. Where possible such visits should take place in private unless 
there are compelling reasons to warrant the contrary; 
(v) the opportunity to receive appropriate medical treatment, and psychological counselling where appropriate; 
(vi) the opportunity to conduct some form of physical exercise through daily indoor and outdoor recreational activities; 
(vii) the opportunity to continue further education or vocational training; 
(viii) the opportunity to exercise their religion and to receive a diet in keeping with their religion; 
(ix) the opportunity to have access to basic necessities i.e. beds, shower facilities, basic toiletries, etc.; 
(x) access to a complaints mechanism, (grievance procedures) where complaints may be submitted either directly or 
confidentially to the detaining authority. Procedures for lodging complaints, including time limits and appeal procedures, 
should be displayed and made available to detainees in different languages. 
 
Conclusion 
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The increasing use of detention as a restriction on the freedom of movement of asylum seekers on the grounds of their 
illegal entry is a matter of major concern to UNHCR, NGOs, other agencies as well as Governments. The issue is not a 
straight-forward one and these guidelines have addressed the legal standards and norms applicable to the use of detention. 
Detention as a mechanism which seeks to address the particular concerns of States related to illegal entry requires the 
exercise of great caution in its use to ensure that it does not serve to undermine the fundamental principles upon which the 
regime of international protection is based. 
 
 
  
 
